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I. INTRODUCTION
Justice O'Connor's interpretation of the religion clauses of the First Amendment
presents a distinct and sophisticated understanding of these two controversial
constitutional phrases. In important ways, however, there is both less and more here
than initially meets the eye. Despite the conviction with which she presents her
constitutional model in this area, O'Connor's religion clausejurisprudence is a work
in progress. Her doctrinal approach is incomplete and continually evolving. Moreover,
her analysis of certain specific questions is sometimes conclusory. Because they appear
to rest so much on O'Connor's own unexplained intuitions, they are only modestly
persuasive. Probably everyone familiar with herjurisprudence can identify particular
religion clause cases where they would challenge her reasoning and results.
Notwithstanding these criticisms, when one steps back from the intricacies of
particular cases, it is clear that there is something of very real value that Justice
O'Connor has brought to this constitutional enterprise. Her opinions, taken
cumulatively, present a multi-dimensional vision that sets out the parameters of the
appropriate relationship between religion and government in our society. That vision
has a distinctive form and content. I also believe it has great substantive merit. Indeed,
although I disagree with some of her religion clause decisions, if I may be forgiven the
vernacular flavor of the expression, I am very much a fan of Justice O'Connor in this
area of constitutional law. Accordingly, in this brief essay, I consider it a privilege to
be given the opportunity to describe and critically examine Justice O'Connor's
interpretation of the Free Exercise Clause and the Establishment Clause in this
Symposium issue of the McGeorge Law Review commemorating her twentieth
anniversary as a Supreme Court Justice.
The focus of the first section of this essay will be the substance of Justice
O'Connor's religion clause opinions, with particular attention directed toward the"endorsement" analysis she employs in Establishment Clause cases. A second section
addresses the form of O'Connor's interpretation of the religion clauses and her
predisposition to utilize standards and balancing tests in this area. Finally, the essay
concludes with a brief description of how Justice O'Connor's jurisprudence fits into
the history of, and continuing debate over, the meaning of the religion clauses.
II. THE SUBSTANCE OF JUSTICE O'CONNOR'S INTERPRETATION
OF THE RELIGION CLAUSES
A. Free Exercise Doctrine
1. A Commitment to Religious Liberty
The core of Justice O'Connor's religion clausejurisprudence can be stated simply.
She takes religious liberty and equality seriously, but she recognizes that neither of
these constitutional values can receive anything like absolute protection in the highly
regulated, interdependent, pluralistic society of modem America. Her understanding
of the Free Exercise Clause is stated most clearly in her concurrence in Employment
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Division v. Smith' in which she challenges the majority's contention that the freedom
to practice one's religion receives no independent constitutional protection of any kind
against neutral laws of general applicability. O'Connor insists that even neutral laws
that substantially burden a person's ability to practice their faith must be justified under
strict scrutiny and condemns the Court's position as clear error on two counts.
First, neutral and general laws can and do prohibit the free exercise of religion.
[A] law that prohibits certain conduct-conduct that happens to be an act of
worship for someone-manifestly does prohibit that person's free exercise of
religion. A person who is barred from engaging in religiously motivated
conduct is barred from freely exercising his religion. Moreover, that person is
barred from freely exercising his religion regardless of whether the law
prohibits the conduct only when engaged in for religious reasons, only by
members of that religion, or by all persons. It is difficult to deny that a law that
prohibits religiously motivated conduct, even if the law is generally
applicable, does not at least implicate First Amendment concerns.
2
Second, O'Connor believes that the rigorous review of such laws is constitutionally
required. "The compelling interest test effectuates the First Amendment's command
that religious liberty is an independent liberty, that it occupies a preferred position, and
that the Court will not permit encroachments upon this liberty, whether direct or
indirect, unless required by clear and compelling governmental interests 'of the highest
order." 3
To O'Connor, religious liberty means just that: it is the ability to practice one's
faith without government interference. A law does not burden religious liberty only if
its purpose is the suppression of religious beliefs or practices. Burdens on liberty are
identified by what they do, by their effect on the protected activity.4 Courts review laws
that interfere with religious practice, even if the laws were not designed to do so, in
order to determine whether the burdens they impose on the exercise of fundamental
rights are adequately justified. Fundamental rights are interests of constitutionally
1. 494 U.S. 872, 891 (1990) (O'Connor, J., concurring in judgment).
2. Id. at 893-94. For a thoughtful presentation of the argument that neutral laws of general applicability
substantially burdening religious practices sufficiently implicate First Amendment concerns tojustify the application
of some serious standard of review, although not strict scrutiny, see Frederick Mark Gedicks, The Normalized Free
Exercise Clause: Three Abnormalities, 75 IND. L.J. 77 (2000).
3. Smith, 494 U.S. at 894-95.
4. In most areas, courts seem willing to protect rights against neutral laws of general applicability that
"incidentally" interfere with their exercise although the rigor of the standard of review is sometimes reduced. Property
rights are protected against both physical and regulatory takings that are defined exclusively in terms of their effect on
the owner's interest. The government's purpose and the scope of the law are largely irrelevant to the determination that
a taking has occurred. See, e.g., Alan E. Brownstein, Constitutional Wish Granting and the Property Rights Genie, 13
CONST. COMMENT. 7, 14-26 (1996). Freedom of expression is also protected against neutral and general laws that are
not directed at the suppression of speech although the level of review provided is modest. See Gedicks, supra note 2,
at 85-94. One might certainly surmise that the right to have an abortion may be infringed by a general law that
substantially restricts all outpatient surgical clinics or a broad law that requires minors to obtain the consent of both
parents before receiving any medical treatment, including an abortion, without providing anyjudicial bypass mechanism.
See generally Friendship Med. Ctr., Ltd. v. Chicago Bd. of Health, 505 F.2d 1141 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S.
997 (1975); Ragsdale v. Turnock, 625 F. Supp. 1212, 1229-30 (N.D. I11. 1985). But see Hodgson v. Lawson, 542 F.2d
1350, 1358 (8th Cir. 1976); Women's Med. Ctr. of Providence, Inc. v. Cannon, 463 F. Supp. 531, 536 (D.R.I. 1978).
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recognized value and only something of real value can legitimize state interference
with their exercise.
O'Connor also recognizes that there is an important equality dimension to the Free
Exercise Clause.5 Religious groups are not similarly situated with regard to their
religious obligations. This means that laws that correspond to the majority's needs and
values will not comparably respect the needs and values of minority faiths. Therefore,
in a religiously pluralistic society, formal neutrality provides no real guarantee of equal
treatment. Indeed, it virtually insures disparity of treatment since people with different
interests will be treated as if they are the same.6 In particularly forceful language,
O'Connor derides the majority in Smith as suggesting "that the disfavoring of minority
religions is an 'unavoidable consequence' under our system of government and that
accommodation of such religions must be left to the political process. ' '7 From
O'Connor' s perspective, the Free Exercise Clause helps to insure that the state respects
the religious differences of its citizens. The Smith decision, by way of contrast, allows
the state to close its eyes and ignore religious differences in enacting and enforcing its
laws.
2. Balancing Religious Liberty Against State Interests
Notwithstanding O'Connor's forceful commitment to interpreting the Free
Exercise Clause to protect religious liberty in its most basic sense-the ability to
practice one's faith without interference-it is also clear that she will subordinate
religious freedom to state interests she believes to be of sufficient importance to
outweigh this right. Religious practitioners will have their day in court, but they will
not always emerge victorious. In this area of law, strict scrutiny does not come close
to being fatal in fact.
O'Connor's opinions give us some sense of how she evaluates state interests that
conflict with religious practice although there is considerable ambiguity in the
balancing process she employs. In Smith itself, she argued that Oregon's interest in
uniformly enforcing its prohibition against the use of controlled substances, in this
instance peyote, justified its refusal to exempt members of the Native American Church
who used peyote in religious rituals from the application of state law.8 It is easy to
understand O'Connor's conclusions that drug abuse is a serious problem requiring
stringent government regulations and that the state has a compelling interest in
5. See Smith, 494 U.S. at 902 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (explaining that "the First Amendment was enacted
precisely to protect the rights of those whose religious practices are not shared by the majority and may be viewed with
hostility").
6. See Alan E. Brownstein, Interpreting the Religion Clauses in Terms ofLiberty, Equality, and Free Speech
Values-A CriticalAnalysis of "Neutrality Theory" and Charitable Choice, 13 NOTREDAMEJ.L. ETHICs & PUB. POL'Y
243, 262-65 (1999) (discussing the effect of formal neutrality on religion by comparing neutral laws that
disproportionately impact racial minorities with laws that burden religious groups).
7. Smith, 494 U.S. at 902.
8. See id. at 905 (quoting U.S. v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 257 (1982)) (explaining that "I would conclude that
uniform application of Oregon's criminal prohibition is 'essential to accomplish' ... its overriding interest in preventing
the physical harm caused by the use of a Schedule I controlled substance"). O'Connor has explained in other areas, such
as the review of affirmative action programs, that she does not believe strict scrutiny is so inherently rigorous a standard
of review that no law can survive its application; see Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200,228-29 (1995).
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prohibiting the use of a drug like peyote that has a high potential for abuse, serves no
medical purpose, and may be dangerous to the health of those who use it.9 However,
several other states and the federal government allow peyote to be used for religious
purposes, apparently without serious consequence, and O'Connor provided little in the
way of analysis to explain why the evidence of other jurisdictions does not undermine
Oregon's claim that its health and safety goals would be impaired if it provided a
similar exemption. At best, O'Connor seems to suggest that where the state's health
and safety interests in regulating a religious practice are clear and substantial, the fact
that some states are willing to risk the sacrifice of those interests out of a commitment
to religious liberty should not compel other states to follow their example.' °
The government's interest must be real and substantial, however, if it is to justify
interference with religious practices. In her partial dissent in Bowen v. Roy, " O'Connor
forcefully challenged the government's claim that in order to combat welfare fraud, it
must deny benefits to individuals who refuse for religious reasons to provide their
social security number to welfare officials. In light of the lower court's findings that
effective, alternative mechanisms for avoiding fraud were available to welfare
authorities when applicants failed to tender their social security number, the state's
interest in pursuing its policy amounted to nothing more than a minor administrative
convenience rationale. 2 To O'Connor, this interest was completely inadequate for
constitutional purposes. The "unanchored anxieties of the welfare bureaucracy" could
not justify the abridgement of Free Exercise rights.'
3
Perhaps the most problematic opinion authored by Justice O'Connor in this area
is her majority opinion in Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Association. 14
At issue were certain timber harvesting practices in, and the construction of a road
through, parts of a national forest that were sacred to Native American tribes and used
for religious ceremonies. O'Connor recognized that "the logging and road-building
projects.., could have devastating effects on traditional Indian religious practices"'
15
and accepted the conclusion of the lower courts that the completion of the road would
"virtually destroy [the] Indians' ability to practice their religion." 16 Nevertheless, she
rejected their Free Exercise claim on the grounds that the government's action would
neither coerce anyone into violating their beliefs nor penalize them for engaging in
their religious practices.' 7
9. Smith, 494 U.S. at 904.
10. See id. at 906 (noting that "other governments may surely choose to grant an exemption without Oregon,
with its specific asserted interest in uniform application of its drug laws, being required to do so by the First
Amendment").
11. 476 U.S. 693, 724 (1986) (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
12. See id. at 731 (criticizing appellants for resting "their case on vague allegations of administrative
inconvenience and harm to the public fisc that are wholly unsubstantiated by the record and the findings of the District
Court").
13. Id. at 730.
14. 485 U.S. 439 (1988).
15. Id. at451.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 449.
The building of a road or the harvesting of timber on publicly owned land cannot meaningfully be
distinguished from the use of a Social Security number in Roy. In both cases, the challenged Government
action would interfere significantly with private persons' ability to pursue spiritual fulfillment according
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The formal and rigid nature of this analysis is difficult to understand. It is one thing
to recognize that the government's organization of its operations and the uses it makes
of its own resources and property are less susceptible to Free Exercise exemptions than
the state's exercise of its regulatory power or its distribution of government largess. It
is another thing entirely to suggest that only state action that coerces or penalizes
religious individuals can ever be subject to Free Exercise review.'8
There may be important reasons why the government would be justified in
burdening religion in a case like Lyng. The road at issue might serve important
government functions. Further, there must be some limits on exemptions that require
the government to cede "de facto beneficial ownership of... spacious tracts of public
property" for religious use.' 9 Finally, the "ameliorative measures" taken by government
to minimize the impact of the road20 may reasonably influence a court's conclusion by
demonstrating that the state is not ignoring the fact that constitutionally protected
interests are at stake. O'Connor recognizes these factors in Lyng, but she does not base
her decision on them. It is the manner in which the government interferes with religious
practices that controls her decision. Making the manner of interference dispositive,
however, cuts a hole in Free Exercise protection that is difficult to defend.
In other cases, O'Connor adopts a more nuanced approach that focuses on the
impact as well as the form of the burden state law imposes on religious practice. In
Jimmy Swaggart Ministries v. Board of Equalization,2' for example, she determined
that a generally applicable sales tax, equally applicable to religious and nonreligious
retail goods, did not violate the Free Exercise Clause simply because it increased the
cost of, and, correspondingly, lowered the demand for, religious products and reduced
the funds available to the seller to be spent on religious activities. O'Connor noted,
however, "that a more onerous tax rate, even if generally applicable, might effectively
choke off an adherent's religious practices" and left open the question of whether such
debilitating taxes should also be upheld.22
to their own religious beliefs. In neither case, however, would the affected individuals be coerced by the
Government's action into violating their religious beliefs; nor would either governmental action penalize
religious activity by denying any person an equal share of the rights, benefits, and privileges enjoyed by
other citizens.
Id.
18. The idea that conflicts between religious beliefs and practices and the government's organization of its
operations and the uses it makes of its own resources and property should always be resolved in favor of the government
has no intrinsic validity. Of course, it may well be that the cost and complexity of accommodating religious individuals
in such circumstances is usually prohibitive and that, as a practical matter, it is much easier to structure exemptions from
regulations than it is to figure out a way to change the government' s internal procedures in a religion-sensitive way. That
conclusion is relative, not absolute, however. There may be some cases where a change in government procedures or
the use of state resources is relatively simple and others where exemptions from regulations are completely impractical.
19. Lyng, 485 U.S. at 453.
20. Id. at 454.
21. 493 U.S. 378 (1990).
22. Id. at 392.
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B. Establishment Clause Doctrine
1. Endorsement and Religious Equality
In Establishment Clause cases, O'Connor is best known for her contention that the
core meaning of this constitutional provision is captured by a mandate prohibiting the
government's endorsement of religion or a particular faith. "Direct government action
endorsing religion or a particular religious practice is invalid," O'Connor explains,
"because it 'sends a message to nonadherents that they are outsiders, not full members
of the political community, and an accompanying message to adherents that they are
insiders, favored members of the political community." 23 Thus, the Establishment
Clause exists to prohibit government action that makes a person's religion relevant to
their "status" in the community.
24
In conventional constitutional parlance, the protection of status is grounded on
normative principles of equality. What is at issue is not the liberty to act, but respect
for who you are.25 Like the black children attending segregated schools whose "hearts
and minds" were harmed by the state's policy of white supremacy, individuals and
groups of minority faiths are injured when the state implicitly or directly disparages
their religious identity while endorsing that of the majority.
26
There is a secondary liberty dimension to the Establishment Clause just as there
is a secondary equality dimension to the Free Exercise Clause. Many Establishment
Clause decisions will protect religious liberty at the same time that they promote
equality. However, the primary objective of antiestablishment principles that focus on
endorsements and status harms is religious equality. Religious liberty is a value that is
incidental to that core concern.27
Particularly in her earlier opinions, O'Connor was not as clear about the equality
foundation of her endorsement analysis as she might have been. The analogy to equal
protection doctrine was always recognized. In Lynch v. Donnelly,28 for example, the
first case in which she discussed the endorsement test, O'Connor wrote that the
question of endorsement "is, like the question whether racial or sex-based
classifications communicate an invidious message, in large part a legal question to be
answered on the basis of judicial interpretation of social facts. 29
In other cases, however, such as Wallace v. Jaffree,3° the moment of silence case,
O'Connor seemed to collapse both Free Exercise and Establishment Clause principles
23. Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 69 (1985) (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment) (quoting Lynch v.
Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 688 (1984)).
24. See Lynch, 465 U.S. at 692 ("What is crucial is that a government practice not have the effect of
communicating a message of government endorsement or disapproval of religion. It is only practices having that effect,
whether intentionally or unintentionally, that make religion relevant, in reality or public perception, to status in the
political community.").
25. See Brownstein, supra note 6, at 258.
26. Alan E. Brownstein, Harmnonizing the Heavenly and Earthly Spheres: The Fragmentation and Synthesis of
Religion, Equality, and Speech in the Constitution, 51 OHIO ST. L.J. 89, 134-37 (1990).
27. Id.
28. 465 U.S. 668, 687 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
29. Id. at 694.
30. 472 U.S. 38, 67 (1985) (O'Connor, J., concurring in judgment).
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into a common framework designed to protect religious liberty against direct or indirect
coercive pressure.3' The result was a muddled combination that hopelessly confused
the issue. O'Connor recognized in Jaffree that the Establishment Clause must operate
as a constraint on the accommodation of religious liberty at least to some extent, 32 but
she failed to explain how two constitutional provisions that serve the same essential
purpose can be in tension with each other.
O'Connor's specific discussion of a moment set aside for silent prayer in public
school classes suffered from similar ambiguities. O'Connor argued that "the face of the
statute or its legislative history may clearly establish that it seeks to encourage or
promote voluntary prayer over other alternatives," and that such a purpose violates the
Establishment Clause because it endorses religion.33 But how can the state's purpose
have an effect on the coercive influence of a law, particularly when students will be
praying or failing to pray in complete silence with their thoughts hidden from both
teachers and peers? If the state's purpose is publicly known, one can imagine a non-
religious student feeling isolated and disfavored during the moment of silence.34 How
the state's legislative purpose can coerce a student's silent thoughts is much harder to
understand.
By 1989, in her concurrence in County ofAllegheny v. ACLU,35 a case invalidating
the placement of a nativity scene in the grand staircase of a county courthouse and seat
of government during the Christmas holiday season, O'Connor demonstrated that her
understanding of the endorsement test had developed substantially. Flatly rejecting
Justice Kennedy's contention that the Establishment Clause only protects religious
liberty against coercive state action, O'Connor insisted that the Establishment Clause
had a broader and distinct meaning that differentiated it from the Free Exercise
Clause's mandate. Religious endorsement or favoritism, not coercion, was the key
concern.36 A more limited interpretation focusing on coercion alone "would not...
adequately protect the religious liberty or respect the religious diversity of the members
of our pluralistic political community.
37
31. See id. at 70 (quoting Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421,431 (1962)) ("[A]n endorsement infringes the religious
liberty of the nonadherent, for '[wihen the power, prestige and financial support of government is placed behind a
particular religious belief, the indirect coercive pressure upon religious minorities to conform the prevailing officially
approved religion is plain."').
32. See id. at 82 ("The challenge... [for the Court is to determine] how to define the proper Establishment
Clause limits on voluntary government efforts to facilitate the free exercise of religion.").
33. Id. at 73.
34. A good example of how legislative purpose influences the endorsing or nonendorsing effect of state action
might be Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217 (1971), a case involving an equal protection challenge to Jackson,
Mississippi's decision to close its previously segregated public swimming pools to avoid continuing to operate them
on an integrated basis. As Justice White correctly argued, unfortunately in dissent, the transparent purpose of the facially
neutral act of closing the pool was to prevent Negroes and whites from swimming together. Because this was the
municipality's purpose, closing the pools was understood by everyone to express the disparaging message that Negroes
are unfit to associate with whites. Id. at 240-41.
Unlike a facially neutral act such as the closing of a swimming pool, race or religion-specific state actions may
communicate messages of exclusion and disfavored status even if their actual purpose is unclear and uncertain.
35. 492 U.S. 573, 623 (1989) (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
36. See id. at 628 (quoting Kennedy, J.) (contending that "any Establishment Clause test limited to 'direct
coercion' clearly would fail to account for forms of'[slymbolic recognition or accommodation of religious faith' that
may violate the Establishment Clause").
37. Id. at 628.
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2. The Meaning of Endorsement
While many commentators have applauded Justice O'Connor's endorsement
analysis and its focus on religious equality,38 the endorsement standard has also been
subjected to serious criticism. First, whether the standard is intended to be applied in
all Establishment Clause cases or only in those that involve the government's display
of religious symbols is unclear.3 9 Second, considerable uncertainty exists as to how a
court determines whether the government's conduct constitutes an endorsement of
religion.4° How the standard is to operate in cases involving the government's funding
of religious institutions or legislative accommodations of religious practices is
particularly unclear.41 Even in religious symbol cases, some of those commentators
who support the endorsement standard in theory have problems with the way O'Connor
has applied it in specific situations. 42 Third, and finally, there are questions about how
the tension between a liberty-based Free Exercise Clause and an equality-based
Establishment Clause can be reconciled.43 In a brief essay such as this one, I can merely
touch on many of these issues, but I believe there are important points that can be made
on each area of concern.
a. The Scope of the Endorsement Standard
With regard to the scope of the endorsement test, the initial problem seems to be
a striking inconsistency of O'Connor's own making. In County ofAllegheny, she writes
that
As a theoretical matter, the endorsement test captures the essential command
of the Establishment Clause, namely that government must not make a
person's religious beliefs relevant to his or her standing in the political
38. See, e.g., LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 14-15, at 1293 (2d ed. 1988); BETTE
NOVIT EVANS, INTERPRETING THE FREE EXERCISE OF RELIGION-THE CONSTITUTION AND AMERICAN PLURALISM 174-
76,237-38 (1997); KENNETH L. KARST, LAW'S PROMISE, LAW'S EXPRESSION 151-54 (1993); Brownstein, supra note
26, at 134-37 (1990); Arnold H. Loewy, Rethinking Government Neutrality Towards Religion Under the Establishment
Clause: The Untapped Potential of Justice O'Connor's Insight, 64 N.C. L. REV. 1049, 1050-51 (1986); Daniel 0.
Conkle, Towarda General Theory of the Establishment Clause, 82 Nw. U.L. REV. 1115, 1164-82 (1988). Not all the
favorable commentary evaluating Justice O'Connor's endorsement test refers to equality literally. Often writers discuss
constitutional values of inclusion, protection against status harms, and political process concerns. These values
correspond to equality interests to a sufficient extent that they can be grouped underthe rubric of constitutional equality.
39. See, e.g., Karst, supra note 38, at 153; Michael W. McConnell, Religious Freedom at the Crossroads, 59
U. CHI. L. REV. 115, 155-56 (suggesting that "[tihe indeterminacies of the endorsement test would not be so serious"
if it was limited in its application to "the context of government symbols").
40. See, e.g., McConnell, supra note 39, at 148-51; Steven D. Smith, Symbols, Perceptions, and Doctrinal
Illusions: Establishment Neutrality and the "No Endorsement" Test, 86 MICH. L. REV. 266,276-302 (1987); William
P. Marshall, "We Know It When We See It" The Supreme Court and Establishment, 59 S. CAL. L. REV. 495, 533-37
(1986).
41. See, e.g., McConnell, supra note 39, at 151-53.
42. See, e.g., Karst, supra note 38, at 149-60 (criticizing O'Connor's application of the endorsement test in
Lynch v. Donnelly); Brownstein, supra note 26, at 145-55.
43. See, e.g., Conkle, supra note 38, at 1164-82; Brownstein, supra note 26, at 163-73.
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community by conveying a message 'that religion or a particular religious
belief is favored or preferred.' 44
Five years later in Board of Education of Kiryas Joel v. Grumet,4 however, O'Connor
eschewed any reliance on a single test or "Grand Unified Theory '46 in interpreting the
Establishment Clause. Here, she explained,
the same constitutional principle may operate very differently in different
contexts. We have, for instance, no one Free Speech Clause test. We have
different tests for content-based speech restrictions, for content-neutral speech
restrictions, for restrictions imposed by the government acting as employer,
for restrictions in nonpublic fora, and so on. This simply reflects the necessary
recognition that the interests relevant to the Free Speech Clause
inquiry-personal liberty, an informed citizenry, government efficiency,
public order, and so on-are present in different degrees in each context.
47
There is less dissonance here than there appears to be. O'Connor is correct that the
endorsement test captures the essential command of the Establishment Clause because
the idea of religious equality which the test expresses lies at the core of the
Establishment Clause's meaning.48 This does not mean, however, that the
Establishment Clause does not serve other values, such as religious liberty and
autonomy, or that other interests need not be taken into account in determining what
the Establishment Clause means in a particular context. Thus, an appropriate concern
about endorsement may be relevant to a wide range of Establishment Clause cases, but
ajudicial test that focuses exclusively, or almost exclusively, on endorsement should
be limited to a much narrower group of situations such as those "involving government
speech on religious topics. '49 Also, as will be discussed shortly, the idea of
endorsement may not capture entirely all of the relevant values subsumed under a
principle of religious equality.50 Thus, O'Connor's comments eschewing a "Grand
Unified Theory" may be no different than the unexceptional argument that the core
command of the Free Speech Clause prohibits government from distorting public
debate to manipulate the discussion and resolution of public policy issues by the polity,
but a host of other values and interests must be taken into account in developing a
coherent and complete set of doctrinal rules for this constitutional provision.
O'Connor is also clearly correct in recognizing that religion, like speech, is a
constitutional interest that requires far more sophisticated doctrine than a unitary test
or principle provides. Indeed, I would argue that religion is a more complex
constitutional interest than speech in that the religion clauses not only subsume many
of the same interests as freedom of expression (since speech is an intrinsic part of a
44. 492 U.S. at 627 (quoting Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 70 (1985)).
45. 512 U.S. 687, 712 (1994) (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
46. Id. at 718.
47. Id.
48. See Brownstein, supra note 26, at 102-12, 125-30, 145-55.
49. Kiryas Joel, 512 U.S. at 720.
50. See infra notes 127-31, 132-33 and accompanying text.
McGeorge Law Review / Vol. 32
great deal of religious practice), but they also promote values supporting equality
among religious groups and the liberty to engage in nonexpressive religious practices
as well. A complete framework for interpreting the religion clauses must synthesize
autonomy, free speech and equal protection principles as they relate to religious
activities, institutions and groups. 5' The only way to simplify and condense religion
clause jurisprudence into one or more simple tests is to completely ignore some of
these core values by substantially limiting the goals of, and protection provided by, this
multifaceted constitutional guarantee.52 As part of a Court on which several Justices
have repeatedly demonstrated their willingness to accept such a truncated version of
the religion clauses,53 O'Connor's insistent recognition of the full complexity of the
religion clauses and the matrix of values they promote can hardly be overestimated in
its importance.
b. Neutral Observers and Social Constructs
The problem of determining exactly what constitutes a prohibited endorsement of
religion is a more difficult one to resolve. O'Connor suggests that the Court should
identify an endorsement by asking whether a "neutral observer" would recognize
government action as communicating a message of religious favoritism.
5 4 Her critics
focus on this aspect of her standard and condemn it on the grounds that O'Connor's
neutral observer has no substance or perspective. Without knowing more about the
alleged observer, courts do not have a coherent basis for deciding how they will
interpret anything that the state does.55
These criticisms are clearly correct. In an important sense, they are equally clearly
irrelevant. O'Connor explained that identifying an endorsement involves the same kind
of "judicial interpretation of social facts" the Court employs in deciding "whether
racial or sex-based classifications communicate an invidious message."
56 The term
"judicial interpretation" may be a bit misleading in this phrase, but the equal protection
analogy O'Connor uses is a powerful one that clarifies her meaning. The idea of
51. See generally, Brownstein, supra notes 6, 26.
52. See Brownstein, supra note 6, at 246-47,256-78. The difficulty with interpreting constitutional requirements
in a way that limits the interests furthered by a right to only a single value or a few values has been recognized as a
problem for the Speech Clause of the First Amendment as well as the religion clauses. See, e.g., Steven Shiffrin, The
FirstAmendment and Economic Regulation: Awayfrom a General Theory of the FirstAmendment, 78 Nw. U. L. REv.
1212, 1251-55 (1983).
53. Justices Rehnquist, Scalia, Kennedy and Stevens demonstrated their lack of commitment to protecting
religious liberty against state interference by narrowly construing the scope of Free Exercise rights in Employment
Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990). Rehnquist, Scalia, and Kennedy would also fundamentally restrict the scope
of the Establishment Clause in religious display cases by allowing states to express the sectarian religious messages of
particular faiths as long as they did not coerce nonbelievers while doing so. Allegheny County v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573,
659-63 (1989). Rehnquist, Scalia, Kennedy and Thomas would dramatically limit the role of the Establishment Clause
in funding cases by permitting pervasively sectarian religious institutions to receive state subsidies and to use that
support to pursue their religious mission. Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 825-29 (2000).
54. See Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 76 (1985) ("The relevant issue is whether an objective observer,
acquainted with the text, legislative history, and implementation of the statute, would perceive it as a state endorsement
of prayer in public schools.").
55. See, e.g., Smithsupra note 40, at 291-95 ("Whose perceptions matter?"); McConnell supra note 39. at 147-
51.
56. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. at 668, 694 (1984).
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endorsement is grounded on cultural understandings of what government may do that
makes some persons feel that they are disfavored outsiders because of their faith or
lack of faith or other persons feel that they are favored insiders. This means that there
are some government actions that cannot reasonably be identified as an endorsement
of religion because there is no interpretative foundation in our society for believing that
anyone would experience them in such a way. In this sense, the endorsement test
involves an interpretation of social facts. But the Court's decision as to which
government actions within the range of conduct that might convey an endorsement
actually violates this constitutional requirement is normative, not factual. It is a value
judgment about the kind of society we should be and the extent to which our society
should respect religious liberty and equality.
Equal protection doctrine operates in exactly the same way. Government takes race
or gender into account in making decisions for a variety of reasons and the state's use
of race or gender classifications may be experienced in many different ways. Cultural
understandings or social facts set the parameters of what kind of government conduct
might reasonably be construed to convey a demeaning message, impose a brand of
inferiority, or reinforce antiquated stereotypes. Determining what constitutes a
violation of equal protection within those parameters, however, is a legal judgment, a
question of constitutional values.
When the Court explains that a racial classification violates the Constitution
because "it demeans a person's dignity and worth to be judged by ancestry instead of
by his or her own merit and essential qualities,"57 the Court's statement involves both
fact and law. Certainly, racial and ethnic classifications are capable of communicating
a demeaning message and in fact may be experienced as doing so. But this does not
mean that every prohibited racial classification is always intended to communicate a
demeaning message or that the classification is always experienced as disparaging.
Indeed, the exact same use of race may be intended to be demeaning by some
government actors, but not others, and it may be experienced as disparaging by some
members of a racial group and as neutral by others. The Court's conclusion about the
invalidity of such classifications involves a normative calculus about the likelihood that
a disparaging message might be intended or will be communicated, the degree to which
that message undermines protected liberty and equality interests, and the utility to the
government in employing the classification.
Some cases will be more difficult than others, but that does not mean that the
Court's concerns about status harms and stigmatic messages are misplaced. Consider
the line of cases dealing with the use of race-based peremptory challenges. In Powers
v. Ohio,58 Justice Kennedy and Justice Scalia disagree on the issue of whether being
excluded from service on a petit jury because of one's race is stigmatizing or
demeaning. Kennedy argues that "stigma or dishonor results if a prosecutor uses the
raw fact of skin color to determine the objectivity or qualifications of ajuror."59 Scalia
57. Rice v. Cayetano, 528 U.S. 495,496 (2000). Although this case is decided on Fifteenth Amendment grounds,
the discussion about race, a part of which is quoted in the text, is fully applicable to Fourteenth Amendment equal
protection principles.
58. 499 U.S. 400(1991).
59. Id.at410.
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contends that no stigma attaches since a race-based peremptory challenge "implies
nothing more than the undeniable reality.. . that all groups tend to have particular
sympathies and hostilities-most notably, sympathies towards their own group
members. 6 °
In part, the argument between these two Justices reflects differing perceptions
about the experience of challenged jurors. Kennedy maintains, for example, that "we
do not believe a victim of the [racial] classification would endorse this view [that no
stigma results]."'6' But this dispute is primarily an issue of law and values. Both
Kennedy and Scalia surely understand that some prosecutors will base their use of
peremptory challenges on what can only be described as invidious stereotypes of the
attitudes of African-Americans while others are using the same kind of professional
hunches they employ when they strikejurors because of their class, vocation, hairstyle,
age, or a host of other variables. Similarly, some excluded jurors will be offended by
the government basing its decision to strike them on their race, while others will be
relieved to be excused from jury service and feel no disparagement whatsoever. The
constitutional rule adopted will be based on a generalization that is proscriptive as well
as descriptive. Thus, Kennedy concludes his argument by affirming that "the
assumption that no stigma or dishonor attaches [to race based peremptory challenges]
contravenes accepted equal protection principles. 62 Stigma, like endorsement, is an
objective legal conclusion grounded on tendencies and inferences, but it is not
dependent on anyone's actual experience.
One may agree or disagree with Kennedy's conclusion about race-based
peremptory challenges, but it is difficult to challenge the importance and relevance of
Kennedy and Scalia's debate. Both of these justices recognize that issues of status and
stigma are appropriate matters for the Court to consider in its attempt to further the goal
of racial equality. Justice O'Connor's endorsement test raises essentially the same
questions about religion and religious equality.
O'Connor's use of the artifact of a "neutral observer," however, may obscure the
similarity and common foundation of endorsement for Establishment Clause purposes
and stigma in equal protection doctrine. One might reasonably ask whether a neutral
observer would recognize the government's use of race or gender as communicating
a disparaging message in the peremptory challenge context or in other cases, but equal
protection cases do not employ this convention. Indeed, it is hard to explain what the
addition of a neutral observer would add to the Court's equal protection analysis.
The same conclusion arguably applies to the idea of endorsement. It is the meaning
of the term, endorsement, and the role that it plays in achieving the Establishment
Clause's constitutional purpose that is critical. In my judgment, O'Connor might be
better off if she jettisoned the neutral observer entirely and concentrated on developing
the meaning of endorsement through a series of judicial decisions that flesh out the
construct's content.
60. Id. at 424 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
61. Id. at410.
62. Id.
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Viewed in this way, the endorsement standard is no different than a host of
commonly utilized constitutional constructs that also involve the "judicial
interpretation of social facts." O'Connor's acceptance of courts developing such
standards is hardly unusual. Courts engage in this kind of activity at every level, from
common law decisions to constitutional holdings. Constructs based on social facts such
as the reasonably prudent person in tort law; expectations of privacy in Fourth
Amendment doctrine; justified investment-backed expectations and economically
viable uses in Takings Clause cases; fighting words, clear and present dangers,
offensive speech in free speech doctrine; stigmatic messages in equal protection cases;
and important or compelling state interests in the standards of review that extend
throughout the constitutional protection of fundamental rights are only a small set of
possible examples. These mixed fact and law conclusions in various degrees describe
cultural understandings (or perceptions) derived from social behavior that are assigned
specific and significant legal consequences in particular cases. In light of the frequency
with which courts use constructs of this kind, it is hardly surprising that O'Connor
employs them in her religion clause decisions.
I do not mean to suggest here that there are not important questions to be raised
about how the Court identifies an endorsement for constitutional purposes. Clearly, that
is a subject worthy of extended discussion and debate. What is disturbing about some
of the criticisms of the endorsement test is the suggestion that there is something
uniquely unfathomable about this principle. But many of the criticisms directed at the
endorsement test are equally applicable to a host of constitutional standards.
The phrase, "fighting words," for example, describes a category of unprotected
speech.63 The core idea is that certain expressions will reasonably and predictably incite
a violent response because of their insulting and vulgar message. In determining what
constitutes fighting words, however, a variety of questions need to be resolved. One
can reasonably wonder whether the standard should only be applied to language that
is intentionally insulting or whether it is the experience of the listener alone that is
controlling. If the listener knows the speaker did not intend his message to be insulting,
should the fighting words doctrine still apply? Reactions among individuals will vary
dramatically, of course. Some people are easily insulted while others can shrug off the
most personal and disparaging language. Does the fact that some individuals would
choose to ignore the language, consider it to be humorous, or respond in a variety of
idiosyncratic ways preclude the recognition of the category in constitutional law? Does
it matter whether the listener is physically incapable of responding with violence
(because they are physically handicapped) or that they have been trained not to respond
to provocation (such as a police officer)? The list of questions goes on.
63. The parallel between the test for identifying fighting words and the endorsement test is hard to avoid.
Whether state action constitutes an endorsement of religion depends on the objective perceptions of a neutral observer.
The basic testforfighting words is "whetheror not men of common intelligence would understand the words as likely
to cause the average addressee to fight." JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW §§ 16-38,
at 1193 (6th ed. 2000).
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Or consider the meaning of a coercion test for the Establishment Clause, a standard
that some of the critics of endorsement have recommended as a substitute 
approach.64
Once again, we may ask whether the state must intend its action to be coercive or
whether it is sufficient that people experience the state's conduct as pressuring them
toward one choice or another. Similarly, there may be a variety of reactions to the same
state action. Not everyone will experience the same event as coercive. Nor is it clear
what kinds of consequences constitute coercion. Is a loss of social status coercive, or
the loss of an opportunity to attend a recreational event, or the inability to escape a
message that someone does not want to hear?65 The parallels to endorsement can be
continued at some length.
c. Endorsements and the State Display of Religious Symbols
What is more important and more appropriately subject to critical evaluation is not
the use of an endorsement standard, but the meaning that O'Connor has assigned to it
in the case law. The issue of endorsement seems particularly germane to cases
involving government displays of religious symbols. Clearly, some state religious
displays constitute a prohibited endorsement, but how is a court to distinguish those
from constitutionally permissible displays?
Two of O'Connor's opinions stand out on this issue. In Lynch v. Donnelly,
66
O'Connor concluded that the public financing of a nativity scene and other traditional
Christmas symbols in a private park in a commercial shopping district did not convey
a message endorsing Christianity. Notwithstanding the obvious religious content
intrinsic in a creche, O'Connor argued that long-standing and widespread
governmental involvement in celebrating the public holiday of Christmas "changes
what viewers may fairly understand to be the purpose of the display" from a message
of state support of particular religious beliefs to a secular declaration of holiday
festivity.67 O'Connor analogized public funding of the creche to such other secular
"'acknowledgments' of religion" as the expression of a prayer to begin legislative
sessions, the public holiday of Thanksgiving, and the opening of Supreme Court
sessions with the statement "God save the United States and this honorable Court.
68
Such activities "because of their history and ubiquity" do not constitute prohibited
endorsements of religion.69
Five years later in County ofAllegheny, O'Connor elaborated on the role of history
in applying the endorsement test while writing in support of the Court's conclusion that
64. See, e.g., Michael M. McConnell, Coercion: The Lost Element of Establishment, 27 WM. &MARY L. REV.
933 (1986). Justice Kennedy, who has been a forceful critic of the endorsement test, has also argued for a coercion
standard as an alternative. See Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 659-63 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
65. Justice Kennedy, for example, concluded that the religious invocation offered in Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S.
577 (1992), was unconstitutionally coercive and violated the Establishment Clause. In criticizing this analysis, Justice
O'Connor argued that it would "deform the language of the test" for the Court "to find 'coercive pressure' when a school
asks listeners-with no threat of legal sanctions-to stand or remain silent during a graduation prayer." Board of Ed.
of Kiryas Joel v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687, 719 (1994) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
66. 465 U.S. 668, 687 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
67. Id. at 692.
68. Id. at 692-93.
69. Id. at 693.
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the placement of an unattended nativity scene during the holiday season in a prominent
location in the county courthouse violated the Establishment Clause. O'Connor
explained that there are no "historical" exceptions to constitutional commands. The
"historical acceptance of a practice does not in itself validate that practice under the
Establishment Clause if the practice violates the values protected by that Clause,just
as historical acceptance of racial or genderbased discrimination does not immunize
such practices from scrutiny under the Fourteenth Amendment., 70 Instead, "the 'history
and ubiquity' of a practice is relevant because it provides part of the context in which
a reasonable observer evaluates whether a challenged governmental practice conveys
a message of endorsement of religion."71 Notwithstanding the history and tradition of
nativity scenes at Christmas time, however, the creche placed on the grand staircase of
the county courthouse was found to violate the Establishment Clause.
In these cases, O'Connor recognizes that many factors must be included in her
contextual analysis. Time is important. The display of a religious symbol that coincides
with the celebration of a holiday to which some secular attributes have accrued over
time communicates a different message than the display of the symbol for a longer
period or at a time that has no connection to any even arguable secular festivity.
Location is also relevant. In Lynch, the temporal congruity to the Christmas
holiday seemed to be the controlling variable to O'Connor. In County ofAllegheny,
however, which also involved a Christmas display, the shift in location from a
commercial setting to the seat of government seemed to be a sufficient difference to
establish an endorsement in the latter case but not the former.72 Similarly, O'Connor
explained that religious paintings hung in a publicly owned museum would not be
construed as conveying an endorsement of the sectarian message expressed in such
works of art.73 Paintings are chosen to be displayed in museums because of their artistic
quality. No one thinks museum paintings depicting war or rape suggest state support
for the subject being portrayed any more than the state endorses the subjects of the
books in a public library. Religious displays of no special artistic distinction standing
alone, in a prominent location in a government building, convey a different message.
Finally, the total content of a display must be considered. The state's presentation
of several religious symbols in an exhibit that is clearly identified as serving a non-
endorsing purpose such as the affirmation of religious liberty or the scope of religious
pluralism in the community would not violate the Establishment Clause. O'Connor
emphasized this factor in County of Allegheny in explaining why she believed a
separate display outside the county courthouse containing a Christmas tree, a Menorah,
and a message saluting religious liberty did not constitute an endorsement of religion,
while the creche inside the courthouse was held to be unconstitutional.74
70. Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 630.
71. Id.
72. See id. at 626 (quoting Lynch, 465 US at 692) ("The display of religious symbols in public areas of core
government buildings runs a special risk of'mak[ing] religion relevant, in reality or public perception, to status in the
political community.').
73. Id. (quoting Lynch, 465 US at 626) ("[D]isplay of the creche is no more an advancement or endorsement
of religion than the Congressional and Executive recognition of the origins of the Holiday itself as 'Christ's Mass', or
the exhibition of literally hundreds of religious paintings in governmentally supported museums."').
74. Id. at 635-36.
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The utility and relevance of variables such as time and location seem self evident.
The role that history and ubiquity play in the endorsement analysis is less clear.
75
O'Connor suggests that the sectarian message of common religious displays has
dissipated because they have "largely lost their religious significance over time,
' 6 but
she does not explain why she believes that the history of'such displays alters their
social meaning.
No length of time, O'Connor concedes, can remove the stigmatic sting of race-
based laws, such as those requiring racially segregated public facilities, or their impact
on the hearts and minds of those disparaged by such laws and practices. Obviously, the
invidious message of racial inferiority expressed by segregation was dramatically
harsher and more pernicious than the message of religious endorsement communicated
by a Christmas display.77 Perhaps O'Connor's point is that the degree to which the
challenged practice communicates a constitutionally prohibited message correlates
inversely with the message's tendency to fade over time.
One may certainly question O'Connor's conclusions about the relationship
between history and cultural meaning, however. Religious icons have remained
powerful symbols for centuries despite their familiarity. Nor does the display of a
symbol during a holiday change its meaning. Indeed, many faiths "pass their [religious]
traditions on to their children through holiday celebrations. 78 Moreover, minor
disparagements of status may not dissipate faster than more forceful messages of
hierarchy even though they have a less pronounced impact. No one would equate the
stigmatic harm caused by the flying of the confederate flag over the capital in South
Carolina with the injurious effect of Jim Crow legislation, yet the continuing
controversy over the flag surely demonstrates that the symbol retains its ability to
communicate a message of racial exclusion.79
Alternatively, one comment in Lynch may have some bearing on this issue. In
analogizing the nativity display at issue to other acknowledgments of religion that also
do not constitute prohibited endorsements because of their history and ubiquity,
O'Connor points to the public reaction to the Christmas display prior to the initiation
of the current litigation. "It is significant," she notes "that the creche display apparently
caused no political divisiveness prior to the filing of this lawsuit."8° There is at least an
75. SeeTribe, supra note 38, at 1295-96 (noting that "some practices, although bom ofreligion, had with time
lost their religious nature" but recognizing that it is difficult to determine when that has occurred).
76. Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 631.
77. Indeed, the quantitative disparity between these examples is so great that it almost overwhelms their
qualitative similarity in sending messages of approval or disapproval. Yet, more than one scholar has drawn an
uncomfortable connection between the "status subordination" resulting from Jim Crow legislation and the consequences
of government displays of the symbols of the dominant faith in a community. See, e.g., Karst, supra note 38, at 151.
Similarly, criticisms of the cavalier disdain for the sensibilities of religious minorities in Justice Burger's opinion in
Lynch have invoked an analogy to Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896). See Laurence H. Tribe, Seven Deadly Sins
of Straining the Constitution Through a Pseudo-Scientific Sieve, 36 HASTINGS L.J. 155, 160-62 (1984).
78. John M. Hartenstein,A Christmas Issue: Christian Holiday Celebration in the Public Elementary Schools
is an Establishment of Religion, 80 CAL. L. REV. 981, 1003 (1992).
79. See Scott Carlson, NCAA Threatens to Join South Carolina Boycott, CHRON. HIGHER EDuc., May 19,2000,
at A68 (quoting Charles T. Wethington Jr., Chairman of the NCAA's Executive Committee and President of the
University of Kentucky, as stating that "the Confederate flag means many things to different individuals, but there is
no question that to a significant number of our constituents, the flag is a symbol of oppression"); Kevin Sack, Symbol
of the Old South Divides the New South, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 21, 1996, at D5.
80. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 693.
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inference here that the complacent reaction of the community to religious displays over
time suggests the display no longer expresses explicit approval of the religious beliefs
of some faith communities while implicitly disapproving the beliefs of others. A
history of intense opposition to religious displays might have led O'Connor to construe
continued state support as a clear endorsement of favored faiths.
This point is an important one. Indeed, several commentators have argued that it
is litigation over religious displays rather than the displays themselves that fuels
religious divisions and intemperance in communities. 8" The contention is
fundamentally unsound, however, from both a general and a specific perspective. As
a general matter, minority silence, without more, cannot and should not be viewed as
acquiescence to alleged disparagements of status. There are too many other
explanations for such behavior. Often minority groups tolerate what they cannot
change because they realize it is futile to express opposition or are intimidated from
doing so.82 Majorities, on the other hand, will all too often choose to misinterpret
resigned acceptance to unequal treatment as an indication that no real harm is being
81. See Smith, supra note 40, at 304-05. McConnell suggests a more temperate and balanced version of the same
point. McConnell, supra note 39, at 192-93.
It is probably true that any perceived alteration in the status quo is likely to reinforce and ignite pre-existing
resentments about religious messages and displays with the group that is satisfied with current conditions expressing
the greatest discontent when changes are threatened. Thus, the creation of new displays or the offering of public prayers
where none had been offered previously may result in as emotional a response as a challenge to an existing display or
prayer policy. See, e.g., Margaret Downing, Trying ToMakeAmens; If Only There Were School Prayer IfOnlylt Was
That Simple, Hous. PRESS, Mar. 30,2000 (describing how aJewish member of a school board "wept [and told] fellow
trustees and the administration she couldn't believe how insensitive they were" after the Board voted to support the
principle of school prayers at school events).
The focus of inquiry for constitutional purposes, however, should not be whether an event triggers religious
divisiveness. It is whether government action expresses and promotes religious differences and hierarchy. See id.
(quoting a school board member's statement that "[t]he community is already divided as far as religion is concerned,
[but] by not having prayer in the schools ... these differences are not highlighted").
82. Protesting state support for majoritarian religious practices has often been a precarious undertaking for
religious minorities. For example, in response to questions raised about the propriety of posting the Ten Commandments
in schools and public buildings in South Carolina since these displays would not reflect the religion of Buddhist or
Muslim residents, one education official replied, "Screw the Buddhists and kill the Muslims." Diana L. Eck, The
Mulitreligious Public Square, in ONE NATION UNDER GOD? RELIGION AND AMERICAN CULTURE 3,5 (Marjorie Garber
& Rebecca L. Walkowitz eds., 1999). Historically, Jewish complaints about prayer or Christmas celebrations in schools
have resulted in harsh and dangerous reactions. See STEPHEN M. FELDMAN, PLEASE DON'T WISH ME A MERRY
CHRISTMAS 208-09 (1997).
To cite a more recent example, when the Florida legislature voted down a school prayer bill in 1994, the bill's
sponsor "publicly blamed its defeat on 'Jewish senators who don't believe in Jesus."' Martin Dyckman, Forcing Prayer
on Students, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Apr. 23, 1995, at 3D. Similarly, ACLU attorneys report that people are often afraid
to complain openly about government displays of religious symbols because the issues are so highly charged and
emotional. See, e.g., Dan Mihalopoulos, ACLU Sues Florissant Arts Agency over Nativity Display; U.S. Judge Plans
Hearing Monday, ST. LOUIS POST DISPATCH, Dec. 21, 1997, at D1.
Numerous cases note evidence of disparaging and intimidating responses that have been directed at religious
minorities or nonbelievers who challenge government endorsements of the majority's religious beliefs. See, e.g., Doe
v. Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist., 933 F Supp. 647,651 (S.D. Tex. 1996) (closing trial on damages to protect the anonymity
of plaintiffs challenging school district's prayer policy in response to evidence demonstrating "the possibility of social
ostracization and violence"); Santa FeIndep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290,294 n. 1 (2000) (describing supplementary
injunction necessitated by school district officials' attempts "to ferret out the identities of the Plaintiffs" after the District
Court permitted them "to litigate anonymously to protect them from intimidation or harassment"); Doe v. Duncanville
Indep. Sch. Dist., 70 F.3d 402,404 (5th Cir. 1995) (describing a history teacher referring to a student who protested
school prayers as a "little atheist" during class followed by comments by fellow students asking "[i]sn't she a
Christian?"); Doe v. Stegall, 653 F.2d 180, 182 n.6 (5th Cir. 1981) (providing plaintiffs a protective order concealing
their identity in light of public responses to their constitutional claims stating that, "[tihe devil is here ... Christians
must beat the evil out of these people" and that plaintiffs' attorney "is aJew ... [who] wants to destroy Christianity").
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done and that the system is operating fairly. 83 It was not that many years ago, after all,
when Southern whites insisted that they had no "Negro" problem in their communities.
Demands for change were dismissed on the grounds that were not representative of the
minority community and the blame for social unrest and growing, public ill will
between the races was placed on the "outside agitators" who created a sense of
grievance where none actually existed.84 Similarly, litigation may ignite the acrimony
generated by state sponsored religious displays,just as civil rights activists kindled the
response to racial subordination, but the quiet heat of minority resentment almost
certainly predated the spark in both cases. 85 Put simply, I would be cautious in
interpreting a lack of public protest by distinct minorities in a community as a lack of
grievances about majoritarian overreaching.
More specifically, the attitude of members of minority religions to public support
of the symbols of other religions is not hard to determine. For many non-Christians, the
fact that state supported displays celebrate the Christmas holidays does not dilute their
83. It is also true, however, that many members of the majority fully appreciate that these displays communicate
a religious message, recognize that they cause offense to religious minorities and nonbelievers, endorse the former
effect, and could not care less about the latter consequence. A poll by the Roper Center at the University of Connecticut,
for example, asked respondents how upset they would be if Congress passed a constitutional amendment permitting
prayer in public schools that is offensive to non-Christians and nonbelievers. Forty-five percent of those polled
answered, "Not at all upset." The poll was conducted by Princeton Survey Research Associates, December 27-December
28, 1994 and based on telephone interviews with a national adult sample of 728. (Sponsor: Newsweek) (Data provided
by The Roper Center for Public Opinion Research, University of Connecticut) [USPSR NEW.94DC27.RI2D].
Another poll asked respondents to assign a rank of one to ten (one being the worst thing that could happen and
ten being the best) to a situation where the courts allow religious symbols "such as Nativity scenes or crucifixes" to be
displayed on public property. Forty-seven percent chose" 10," indicating that this was the best thing that could happen.
It is difficult to equate such enthusiasm with the belief that these symbols are devoid of religious significance and
represent nothing more than casual, secular traditions associated with a public holiday. The poll was conducted by The
Terrance Group & Mellman, Lazarus & Lake, March 5-March 7, 1994 and based on telephone interviews with a national
registered voters sample of 1045. (Sponsor: U.S. News & World Report) (Data provided by The Roper Center for Public
Opinion Research, University of Connecticut) [USMELL.032694.R57B].
84. See, e.g., C. VANN WOODWARD,THE STRANGECAREER OFJIM CROW 168-69 (Oxford Univ. Press, 1974)
(noting that "until 1960... the Southern resistance had been able to persuade itself that the civil rights movement was
wholly the result of 'outside agitators,' that Southern Negroes were contented and happy with the 'Southern way of life,'
that they preferred segregation, and that left to themselves they would never think of protesting"); 102 CONG. REC. 4515-
16 (daily ed. Feb. 20, 1956) (statement of Rep. Smith) (condemning the Supreme Court decision in Brown v. Boardof
Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), for "destroying the amicable relations between the white and Negro races that have
been created through [ninety] years of patient effort by the good people of both races... [and planting] hatred and
suspicion where there had been heretofore friendship and understanding").
85. At the beginning of the Montgomery Bus Boycott, Martin Luther King described his feelings to the black
community of that city:
We are here this evening to say to those who have mistreated us for so long that we are tired-tired of being
segregated and humiliated, tired of being kicked about by the brutal feet of oppression .... We come here
tonight to be saved from the patience that makes us patient with anything less than freedom and justice.
DAVID R. GOLDFIELD, BLACK, WHITE, AND SOUTHERN 99 (1990). For a longer, historic statement of the resentment
against injustice that led, ultimately, to civil rights protests, see Martin Luther King, Jr., Letterfrom Birmingham Jail,
in FREEDOM Now! THE CIVIL RIGHTS STRUGGLE IN AMERICA 10-21 (Alan F. Westin ed., 1964).
Let me be as emphatically clear as I can be here that the point of my analogy is not to draw some kind of moral
parallel between religious holiday displays and racial segregation. No such equivalence exists. What may be analogized
is the mistaken impression that the lack of protest by religious or racial minority groups to hierarchical acts by the
majority suggests acquiescence. It is also true that the idea of endorsement, grounded as it is on public acts suggesting
that certain religious groups are favored or disfavored by the state, has qualitative similarities to other expressions of
ethnic favoritism. These arguments, however, say nothing about the comparative impact of such practices. It should be
obvious that the appropriate normative analogy to coerced racial segregation would be the kind of coerced religious
segregation sometimes practiced in Europe in the not so distant past.
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religious message.86 Government involvement in religious activities is considered to
be problematic for the very reason that the endorsement test suggests. When the state
speaks about religion, the cacophony of private voices is replaced by an inauthentic
homogenized unity that subordinates smaller faiths to the controlling tones of the
majority.87
Part of the problem here is that members of majority faiths may have an entirely
different perspective and experience than religious minorities of the same event or
display. Until they are challenged, the majority will often consider symbols that
resonate with their faith to be a neutral reflection of the natural order of things rather
than an endorsement of their own beliefs.88 But the social meaning of such symbols is
86. See, e.g., Mark Tushnet, The Constitution ofReligion, 18 CONN. L. REV. 701, 712 n.52 (1986) (suggesting
that "it is difficult to believe that the Lynch majority would have reached the same result had there been a Jew on the
court to speak from the heart about what public displays of creches really mean to Jews"); Tribe, supra note 38, at 1293
n.66 (quoting N. Redlich, Nativity Ruling Insults Jews, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 26, 1984: "[w]hen I see a government-
supported creche, I suddenly feel as if I have become a stranger in my own home, tobe tolerated only as long as I accept
the dominant religious values").
87. The diversity of religious faiths in the United States virtually guarantees that no singular religious expression
can effectively represent the faiths living in a community. Thus, for example:
[I]n 1985, the National Council of the Buddhist Churches of America approved a statement... insisting that
any form of school prayer would implicitly impose a form of religiousness privileging certain theological
and religious notions of 'God' and 'prayer.' The statement reads... 'Prayer, the key religious component,
is not applicable in Jodo Shin Buddhism which does not prescribe to a Supreme Being or God (as defined
in the Judeo-Christian tradition) to petition or solicit; and allowing any form of prayer in schools and public
institutions would create a state sanction of a type of religion which believes in prayer and 'The Supreme
Being,' would have the effect of establishing a national religion and, therefore, would be an assault on the
religious freedom of Buddhists.
Eck, supra note 82, at 13; see also J. Michael Parker, Hindu Takes Offense to Prayer at High School Graduation, THE
PATRIOT LEDGER, June 10, 2000, at 29 (describing the objections of Hindu families to Christian prayer offered at high
school graduation); Editorial, The Diversity Grinches, INVESTOR'S Bus. DAILY, Dec. 18, 1995, at A2 (noting that
Muslims protested the failure of Grand Central Station's holiday display to include stars and crescents along with
Christmas wreaths and menorahs); Michael Saul, Prayers Invoking Christ Bother Some on Council; Pastor Resists
Nondenominational Slantfor Meeting, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Oct. 11, 1998, at 35A (quoting Jewish City council
members who feel excluded when Christian prayers are offered before meetings begin).
88. Thus, the use of a religious symbol or message without having an explicit and conscious intent to endorse
one's faith can not be dispositive of the issue of endorsement. The presumption that one's religious beliefs are so widely
accepted that there is no one on the outside, or at least no one whose contrary understandings are worthy of respect, can
constitute an endorsement in its own right. The story of a University of Colorado basketball coach who supported a
policy of organized team prayer provides a good illustration of this point When the coach was asked if he had ever
offered a non-Christian prayer, he responded "'What's a non-Christian prayer?' Mike Littwin, In State Board We Do
Not Trust, DENVER ROCKY MOUNTAIN NEWS, July 9, 2000, at 3B.
The recurrent stories in newspapers about wishing people "Merry Christmas" illustrates the multiple meanings
of messages from a slightly different perspective. Most non-Christians I know are not offended when someone wishes
them a "Merry Christmas." But there is a disconnecthere for the people of other faiths. Most of the time when one
person wishes another a happy birthday, or anniversary, or Thanksgiving, or Fourth of July, there is an implicit
recognition that the person who is spoken to is celebrating the holiday or event to which the speaker refers. We rarely
extend similar wishes to people regarding holidays that are not celebrated in some formal sense. No one says Happy
Lincoln's Birthday, for example. Similarly, for the most part we do not offer holiday greetings to people who do not
celebrate the holiday in question. I do not wish people a happy anniversary on my anniversary and I do not wish my
Christian friends Happy New Year on Rosh Hashanah any more than I wished my neighbors in Halifax a Happy Fourth
of July during the sabbatical year I spent in Canada.
As one rabbi put it in commenting on the December dilemma, "I wish my Christian friends a merry and blessed
Christmas and send them Christmas greetings. If you are a Christian, please don't wish me a Merry Christmas-it's not
my holiday. Express your hopes that I have a Happy Hanukkah." Rabbi Richard Marcovitz, Hannukkah Celebrates a
Victory, SATURDAY OKLAHOMAN, Dec. 11, 1999.
The point, of course, is not that anyone intends to be offensive when they wish someone a Merry Christmas. It
is almost impossible for there to be an intent to offend because it so rarely registers in the speaker's mind that he is
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more accurately reflected by the change in attitude and ensuing discomfort that results
when members of majority faiths are confronted with government displays involving
other faiths as opposed to the majority's experience of displays that affirm their own
religious identity.89 People expect government to speak for the people. When it
expresses a message that conflicts with a group's core identity, it creates a jarring
dissonance raising doubts whether the group is included and respected in the broader
community that the state represents. 90
addressing someone who does notcelebrate this holiday. But that is part of the problem. Respecting religious minorities
requires some recognition that they exist and that they hold different beliefs from those of the majority. See generally
Charles Taylor, The Politics ofRecognition, in MULT1CULTURALISM AND THE POLITICS OFRECOGNITION 25, 38 (Amy
Gutman ed., 1992) (elaborating on the idea that "the development of the modern notion of identity"and the demand for
"a principle of universal equality" combine to create a politics of difference that requires respect for the unique identity
of individuals and groups and sharply challenges government actions where "this distinctness... [is] ignored, glossed
over, assimilated to a dominant or majority identity").
The other part of the problem is that Christmas Greetings often involve multiple meanings. There is the generic
message of "enjoy your day off from work." But there is also a faith-based account of religious beliefs which represent
the core of Christian theology and distinguish Christianity from other religions. Both messages are so intertwined that
they can not easily or meaningfully be separated from each other.
Thus, one critical writer expressed profound confusion as to why anyone would prefer not to be wished a Merry
Christmas: "What kind of misanthrope would refuse a wish to have a happy day?" MD. Harmon, A Phrase Has
Dropped Out of Public Use, So Let's Put It Back; We're So Afraid of Offending A Few That We've Lost the Chance to
OfferA Blessing to Multitudes, PORTLAND PRESS HERALD, Dec. 20, 1999, at 9A. The writer then went on to explain,
"[w]hat better tonic for the soul can there be? The story about God so loving the world that he sent his own son, born
as a human baby, to be its redemption, has no menace in it. That's the case whether you consider it the literal truth, as
Christians do, or just a pleasant story.
There is no harm in 'Merry Christmas'--only a willingness to share the good news of a love so great that It
humbled Itself to become one of us." Id.
89. Diana Eck summarizes this response succinctly: "Not only have immigrants brought Buddhist, Sikh, and
Muslim traditions of faith to these shores, but the visible markers of their religious faith often become the symbolic
flashpoints of conflict in an America presumptively construed [by some] as normatively Christian or 'Judeo-Christian."'
Eck, supra note 82. Kenneth Karst describes the "letters of protest [that] poured in" when UCLA had the temerity to
invite a Buddhist priest to give the invocation at its graduation ceremony. Karst, supra note 38, at 158.
See also Patt Morrison, Playing Fair, and Giving All Gods Equal Time, L.A. TIMES, June 25, 2000, at
B I (describing how people complained that they felt "left out, maybe even insulted" when a Zen Buddhist closing prayer
was offered to end high school graduation because "[it wasn't a prayer of their faith or their Lord").
Certainly, there are numerous instances of members of majoritarian religions criticizing the public displays of
symbols they believe are inconsistent with their faith. See, e.g., Guyer v. Sch. Bd., 634 So.2d 806 (Fla. App. 1994)
(challenging Halloween displays at public school as promoting the religion of "Wicca"); Proclamation Draws Fire,
RALEIGH, N. C. NEWS & OBSERVER, Oct. 23, 1999, at A3 (noting complaints brought by Baptist ministers and others
asking mayor to rescind Proclamation for Earth Religions Awareness Week and declare "Lordship of Jesus Christ
Week" in its place); Joseph Perkins, ISay They Should Go to the Devil, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Mar. 8, 1996, at B I
(criticizing "a contemptible band of atheists" who obtained a permit to "hold their own ungodly services" on Easter
Sunday on Mount Soledad because "the blasphemers [erroneously] believe they have the same rights as Christians to
hold services beneath Mount Soledad's cross" on public property).
90. See generally Taylor, supra note 88, at 36 (explaining that "equal recognition is not just the appropriate
mode for a healthy democratic society" but that "its refusal can inflict damage on those who are denied it...").
An analogy here may be helpful. The familiarity of seeing the American flag flying over government buildings
is such that many Americans might not consciously experience this display as an endorsement of our country each time
that they see it. The flag simply belongs there. It resonates so much with who we are and how we see ourselves that its
message fades into the background. Yet no one could doubt that flying the flag is an endorsement of the United States.
The jarring dissonance we would experience in seeing a foreign flag on government buildings or other public institutions
confirms that reality. Our sense that the foreign flag does not belong there because it does not symbolize who we are,
more than our sometimes jaded response to our own flag, establishes the message the American flag communicates.
Similarly, we may evaluate the meaning of state-supported religious displays not by inquiring how the majority
experiences displays that resonate with their own beliefs, but rather by considering the reaction of the majority to
government support fordisplays that challenge the tenets of their faith. The response to these displays and events, which
is often far less favorable than it is to state-sponsored expression that resonates with their own faiths, suggests that
religious symbols have not lost their vitality or meaningfulness or their power to include or divide.
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In addition to her attempts to take history into account, O'Connor's application of
her endorsement standard in religious symbol cases seems to be influenced by the
majority and minority status of religious groups. In an important sense, this is an overt
and unmistakable aspect of her overall analysis. O'Connor's contention that
endorsement is the core concern of the Establishment Clause recognizes that the force
of this provision is directed at preventing the social and status subordination of
minority faiths by a self-affirming majority.
There is a more subtle, but perhaps more distinctive, sense, in which O'Connor's
analysis is influenced by this reality, however. To the consternation of her conservative
colleagues, O'Connor argues repeatedly that the facial neutrality of government
practices, standing alone, is not enough to satisfy constitutional commands in situations
where formal rules of equal treatment might ordinarily be expected to fulfill
constitutional requirements. For example, in Capitol Square v. Pinette,9' a case
involving a private group's placement of a cross in a traditional public forum, she
argued at some length that in certain circumstances the state's decision to permit
private religious speech on public property may still constitute an endorsement of
religion prohibited by the Establishment Clause. The facial neutrality of the standards
the state employs to determine which speakers will get access to the area for their
expressive activities cannot resolve this issue. 92 The consequences resulting from the
use of neutral criteria must also be taken into account.9 3
What explains or justifies O'Connor's rejection of neutral standards as the
controlling factor in this case and others like it? I think her analysis must be grounded
on the reality that neutral standards may have a significantly different effect on groups
depending on their majority or minority status in a community. In an evenly divided,
religiously pluralistic society, relatively equal access rules will result in an expressive
environment where a sufficiently broad panoply of faiths are represented so that no
perception of endorsement can accrue to any one religious group.94 In a less diverse
area where there is considerable religious polarization and the majority religion far
exceeds the size of any minority faith, public property strongly associated with
government, such as the lawn in front of city hall, may be controlled and dominated by
the symbols of the majority despite the technically neutral criteria used to allocate
expressive opportunities. To O'Connor, this latter result may constitute an endorsement
of religion.
It should be emphasized, however, that O'Connor's recognition of the effect of
majority and minority status on the application of the endorsement test to government
91. 515 U.S. 753 (1995) (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment).
92. See id. at 777 ("Governmental intent cannot control, and not all state policies are permissible under the
Religion Clauses simply because they are neutral in form.").
93. See id. ("Where the government's operation of a public forum has the effect of endorsing religion, even if
the governmental actor neither intends nor actively encourages that result . . . the Establishment Clause is
violated.... At some point, for example, a private religious group may so dominate a public forum that a formal policy
of equal access is transformed into a demonstration of approval.").
94. See, e.g., Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 850 (1995) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring) (explaining that university support of a religious periodical published by students does not violate the
Establishment Clause because the "wide array of nonreligious, antireligious and competing religious viewpoints in the
forum supported by the University, [makes] any perception that the University endorses one particular
viewpoint.., illogical").
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religious displays is relatively limited. In many ways, O'Connor remains committed
to formal equality for Establishment Clause purposes just as she insists on the rigorous
review of affirmative action programs assisting discrete and insular minorities in equal
protection cases. Thus, in County ofAllegheny, in evaluating whether the joint display
of a menorah and a Christmas tree outside of the county courthouse constituted a
multiple endorsement of religion, O'Connor clearly rejected the suggestion that the
display of a religious symbol of a minority faith in a community could not be construed
to constitute an endorsement of that religion.95 Indeed, as will be discussed in the next
section, this commitment to formal equality is a crucial component of the way that
O'Connor applies the endorsement test in other kinds of Establishment Clause cases
that do not involve the state's expression of religious messages.
d. Endorsements and Legislative Accommodations of Religion
Perhaps no application of the endorsement test has been so controversial or seems
so poorly developed as its use in cases involving the legislative accommodation of
religion.96 O'Connor asserts that the neutral observers whose perspective determine
whether state action constitutes an endorsement must be understood to be sufficiently
familiar with the Free Exercise Clause and the tension between Free Exercise and anti-
Establishment principles that they will take Free Exercise values into account in
determining whether religious exemptions or accommodations unconstitutionally
endorse religion.97 Having said that, however, she offers virtually no guidance on how
the neutral observer is to accomplish such a synthesis of competing values. Nor does
she explain how a neutral observer's understanding of Free Exercise doctrine will assist
them in resolving the very different problem of determining when discretionary
legislative accommodations of religion that are not constitutionally required should
survive Establishment clause review. Indeed, O'Connor's opinions in these cases rarely
even identify the factors a court should consider in deciding when Establishment
Clause violations occur.
In Corporation of the Church of Latter-Day Saints v. Amos, 98 for example,
O'Connor concurred in the majority's judgement that amendments to Title VII's ban
on religious discrimination in hiring that permit religious organizations engaged in non-
profit activities to hire only employees of the organization's faith do not violate the
Establishment Clause. She explained that "government action lifting from religious
organizations a generally applicable regulatory burden" does advance religion, 99 but
it is the Court's job to "separate those benefits to religion that constitutionally
accommodate the free exercise of religion from those that provide unjustifiable awards
of assistance to religious organizations."'00 Having set out that framework, O'Connor
95. Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 634.
96. See, e.g., McConnell, supra note 39, at 150-51.
97. See Wallace, 472 U.S. at 83 ("[I]n determining whether [a] statute conveys the message of endorsement of
religion or a particular religious belief-courts should assume the 'objective observer[]'... is acquainted with the Free
Exercise Clause and the values it promotes.").
98. 483 U.S. 327, 346 (1987) (O'Connor, J., concurring in judgment).
99. Id. at 348.
100. Id.
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observes that the Title VII amendments do operate to relieve religious organizations
from real burdens on the practice of their faith because it is highly probable that
nonprofit activities will be "involved in the organization's religious mission."
Accordingly, she concludes that the amendments should be construed to be a
permissible accommodation of religion.'0 °
The discussion is entirely circular and omits the crucial middle step of the analysis.
Having explained that the Court must screen discretionary legislative decisions that
relieve religious organizations from the burdens imposed on them by generally
applicable laws to determine whether they cross the line from accommodation to
endorsement, O'Connor's conclusion that the Title VII amendments will relieve
religious organizations of government imposed burdens on their operation starts, but
doesn't complete, the constitutional analysis. Literally nothing is said about the
remaining question of how a court would distinguish this relief of a burden from an
attempted accommodation that did violate the Establishment Clause.
Other opinions are also less helpful and persuasive than they need to be. In Estate
of Thornton v. Caldor,'0° O'Connor concludes that a state law requiring private
employers to give religiously observant employees an absolute preference in having
their Sabbath day off from work violates the Establishment Clause. She distinguishes
Title VII's requirement that employers must reasonably accommodate the religious
practices of employees, in part, on the grounds that this standard is more flexible, less
harmful to the interests of third parties, and therefore more likely to be perceived as
serving antidiscrimination goals.0 3 Again, there is an unexplained disconnect in the
analysis. Since observant religious individuals will not be able to retain theirjobs if
they are ordered to work on their Sabbath, it is not clear why absolute protection from
such a requirement cannot also be understood to further antidiscrimination goals. There
may well be a link between the magnitude of the burden a religious accommodation
places on third parties and the constitutionality of such state decisions, but the content
of such a "harm to others" standard and its connection if any to an endorsement
analysis remains to be determined.' °4
Similarly, in Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, °5 O'Connorjoins Justice Blackmun's
concurring opinion in invalidating a state law exempting religious periodicals from a
generally applicable sales tax that applies to other expressive materials. Again, these
justices recognize that some accommodations of religion are permissible, but fail to
explain why they are convinced that this one is not. They simply proclaim that "a
statutory preference for the dissemination of religious ideas offends our most basic
101. Id. at 349.
102. 472 U.S. 703, 711 (1985) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
103. Id. at 712 ("Since Title VII calls for reasonable rather than absolute accommodation and extends that
requirement to all religious beliefs and practices rather than protecting only the Sabbath observance, I believe an
objective observer would perceive it as an anti- discrimination [sic] law rather than an endorsement of religion or a
particular religious practice.").
104. See, e.g., Jonathan C. Lipson, On Balance: Religious Liberty and Third-Party Harms, 84 MINN. L. REV. 589
(1999); Smith v. Fair Employment & Hous. Comm'n, 913 P.2d 909,928-29 (Cal. 1996) (discussing whether religious
accommodations substantially effecting the rights of third parties are justified).
105. 489 U.S. 1, 26 (1989) (Blackmun, J., with whom O'Connor, J., joins, concurring in judgment).
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understanding of what the Establishment Clause is all about and hence is
constitutionally intolerable."'
0 6
The one principle that emerges from O'Connor's opinions in this area is her
marked reluctance to accept sect-specific and even religion-specific accommodations
and her concern about religious discrimination in providing exemptions. In Thornton
v. Caldor, O'Connor challenged the decision of the state to protect Sabbath observers
"without according similar accommodation to ethical and religious beliefs and
practices of other private employees."'' 0 7 In Texas Monthly, she joined with Justice
Blackmun in suggesting that a broader exemption for both religious periodicals and
philosophical materials dealing with matters of conscience and good and evil might
survive constitutional review.'0 8
Similarly, in Hernandez v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue,' °9 O'Connor
dissented from the Court's decision to uphold the Internal Revenue Service's refusal
to allow Scientologists to deduct expenditures for "auditing," as charitable
contributions. The IRS argued that a deduction was inappropriate because the followers
of this religion received benefits in return from their payments to the religious
organization. To O'Connor, the Scientologists' quid pro quo arrangement offering the
spiritual benefits of "auditing" in return for contributions was no different than the
more conventional payment of pew rents and membership dues to churches and
synagogues that result in congregants receiving assignments of specific seats for
worship or tickets for special services. Accordingly, she argued, all faiths must receive
similar treatment from the IRS; the deductions must be disallowed for no one or for
everyone. o
O'Connor's clearest expression, and the most dramatic example, of her concern
about preferential sect accommodations is her concurring opinion in Board of
Education of Kiryas Joel v. Grumet."' The New York legislature created a special
school district for a village comprised entirely of members of the Sitmar Hasidim, a
small Jewish sect, in order to provide this insular religious group access to publicly
financed remedial educational services without their children having to leave their
community to attend public school in a neighboring town. O'Connor voted to
106. Id. at 28.
107. Thornton, 472 U.S. at 711.
108. See Texas Monthly, 489 U.S. at 27-28 (Blackmun, J.,joined by O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment).
Perhaps it is a vain desire, but I would like to decide the present case without necessarily sacrificing either
the Free Exercise Clause value or the Establishment Clause value. It is possible for a State to write a tax-
exemption statute consistent with both values: for example, a state statute might exempt the sale not only
of religious literature distributed by a religious organization but also of philosophical literature distributed
by nonreligious organizations devoted to such matters of conscience as life and death, good and evil, being
and nonbeing, right and wrong.
Id.
109. 490 U.S. 680, 704 (1989) (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
110. O'Connor argued that Hernandez "involves the differential application of a standard based on
constitutionally impermissible differences drawn by the Government among religions. As such, it is best characterized
as a case of the Government 'put[ting] an imprimatur on [all but] one religion.'... That the Government may not do."
Id. at 712 (quoting Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437, 450 (1971)).
111. 512 U.S. 687, 712 (1994) (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
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invalidate this accommodation on the grounds that it discriminated in favor of a
particular religious group. She explained:
I realize this is a'close question, because the Satmars may be the only group
who currently need this particular accommodation. The legislature may well
be acting without any favoritism, so that if another group came to ask for a
similar district, the group might get it on the same terms as the Satmars. But
the nature of the legislative process makes it impossible to be sure of this. A
legislature, unlike the judiciary or many administrative decisionmakers, has
no obligation to respond to any group's requests. A group petitioning for a law
may never get a definite response, or may get a 'no' based not on the merits
but on the press of other business or the lack of an influential sponsor. Such
a legislative refusal to act would not normally be reviewable by a court. Under
these circumstances, it seems dangerous to validate what appears to me a clear
religious preference. 112
The problem with O'Connor's approach to these issues is not that she takes
equality values seriously. Her concern about favoritism and discrimination in the
granting of exemptions is both proper and necessary. What is lacking is an appreciation
of the liberty burdens and disparate impacts that result when accommodations are
rejected and an analytic approach that facilitates judicial recognition of the conflicting
principles that are in play in many of these cases.
e. Endorsements and State Funding of Religious Organizations
Unlike her analysis of legislative accommodations, Justice O'Connor's
constitutional evaluation of government spending programs that subsidize religious
organizations is extremely detailed. It identifies a range of principles and factors that
must be considered in determining the constitutionality of such financing frameworks.
What is lacking here is a convincing connection to the endorsement and equality-based
values which form the foundation of her Establishment Clause jurisprudence.
O'Connor remains committed to the principle that public funds can not be used for
religious purposes. In Mitchell v. Helms," 3 the Court's most recent case involving aid
to religious schools, she joined the Court's decision allowing the state to supply
computers to secular and religious private schools. However, O'Connor forcefully
rejected the views of the four-justice plurality that suggested state financial support can
be used by religious organizations to promote their religious mission as long as funds
are made available to both secular and religious organizations under neutral criteria and
the state receives the secular benefit it seeks from the programs it subsidizes." 4 Here,
again, O'Connor stood by her conviction that the Establishment Clause as well as the
Free Exercise Clause require more than formal neutrality. Applying this understanding
112. Id. at 716-17.
113. 530 U.S. 793, 836 (2000) (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment).
114. Id. at 837 (" [W] have never held that a government-aid program passes constitutional muster solely because
of the neutral criteria it employs as a basis for distributing aid.").
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to funding cases, O'Connor acknowledged that formal neutrality may be a necessary
condition for the funding of religious organizations, but she maintained that neutral
allocations alone were not enough to satisfy Establishment Clause review. 115
The principle that public funds cannot be used for religious purposes is not
absolute, however. In certain situations such aid may be permissible when the context
and circumstances preclude the funding being perceived as an endorsement of religion
or of a particular faith. Thus, O'Connor supported holdings that accept the use of state
funds for religious purposes in three cases and has elaborated on her reasons for doing
so in dicta in other opinions." 16
In Lynch v. Donnelly, the creche case discussed earlier, O'Connor upheld state
support for a Christmas nativity display on the grounds that it would be understood to
serve the secular purpose of celebrating a public holiday. 17 Rosenberger v. Rectors and
Visitors of the University of Virginia' 8 involved more complicated facts and a more
sophisticated analysis. The University of Virginia provided financial support to a wide
range of student groups and activities out of the mandatory fees it collected from the
student body. It refused to provide support to religious activities, however, and on that
basis rejected a request for funds from a student group that sought to publish a religious
magazine. The students successfully challenged the University's denial of support on
the grounds that it constituted viewpoint discrimination in a designated public forum
and violated the First Amendment.
Justice O'Connor wrote a concurring opinion in Rosenberger explaining why the
public financing of a religious periodical would not violate the Establishment Clause
on the unique facts of this case. The University disclaimed any connection to or
responsibility for the expression of the student groups that received its support. The
University's funds would be paid directly to the printer of the magazine. Public funds
would not even pass through the hands of the student group. Finally, the University
subsidized such a wide array of activities and expression that it was extremely unlikely
that anyone would think that the University itself endorsed any particular message
communicated by the student groups whose activities it financed. Accordingly, in this
circumstance, constitutional concerns for government neutrality toward religion
superceded the constitutional principle prohibiting state support for religion. "9
Finally, Justice O'Connor has made it clear that she distinguishes between direct
financial aid to religious schools that is used for religious purposes and aid that is
distributed to the religious school through the intermediary decisions of parents and
students who participate in a "private choice" or voucher program. The former raises
far more serious Establishment Clause concerns than the latter because of the
likelihood that it will be perceived as an endorsement of religion. Thus, in Witters v.
Washington Department of Services for the Blind,120 shejoined the Court in concluding
that the Establishment Clause did not bar the state from providing vocational
115. See id. (quoting Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819,846 (1995)) ("[Nleutrality
is important, but it is by no means the only 'axiom in the history and precedent of the Establishment Clause."').
116. See supra text accompanying notes 115-27.
117. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 691.
118. 515 U.S. 819, 846 (1995) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
119. Id. at 852.
120. 474 U.S. 481,493 (1986) (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
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rehabilitation funds to a blind person who planned to use the support he received to
attend a religious college and prepare for a career as a minister or missionary.
O'Connor later explained her position on private choice programs in more detail
in her lengthy concurrence in Mitchell v. Helms.
In terms of public perception, a government program of direct aid to religious
schools based on the number of students attending each school differs
meaningfully from the government distributing aid directly to individual
students who, in turn, decide to use the aid at the same religious schools. In the
former example, if the religious school uses the aid to inculcate religion in its
students, it is reasonable to say that the government has communicated a
message of endorsement . . . In contrast, when government aid supports a
school's religious mission only because of independent decisions made by
numerous individuals to guide their secular aid to that school, '[n]o reasonable
observer is likely to draw from the facts ... an inference that the State itself
is endorsing a religious practice or belief."'"
Notwithstanding her commitment to the principle prohibiting direct financial
support to religious organizations for religious purposes, in a series of cases including
Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills School District, 22 Witters v. Washington Department of
Services For the Blind,23 Agostini v. Felton,124 and Mitchell v. Helms,125 O'Connor
showed little sympathy for many of the rules and presumptions previously employed
by the Court to limit state aid involving secular instructional materials or state
employees to "pervasively sectarian" religious organizations performing secular
activities. For example, she challenged the assumption that religious schools are so
likely to ignore state requirements prohibiting them from using publicly provided
instructional materials for religious purposes that they must be subjected to intrusive
monitoring and supervision. 126 Similarly, O'Connor saw little basis for a blanket rule
prohibiting the distribution to religious schools of any instructional materials that were
capable of being diverted from secular to religious purposes. The appropriate constraint
in such a situation would be a clear statement from state authorities that such diversions
were not permitted and modest monitoring to insure compliance with that requirement,
not a complete repudiation of such support. 127 O'Connor also strongly disputed the
suggestion that state employees providing secular remedial services to parochial school
121. Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 842 (quoting Witters, 474 U.S. 481, 493 (1986)).
122. 509 U.S. I, 24 (1993) (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
123. 474 U.S. 481, 493 (1986) (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
124. 521 U.S. 203 (1997).
125. Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 842 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment).
126. Id. at 863-64 ("1 disagree with the plurality and Justice Souter on this point and believe that it is entirely
proper to presume that these school officials will act in good faith. That presumption is especially appropriate in this
case, since there is no proof that religious school officials have breached their schools' assurances or failed to tell
government officials the truth.").
127. See id. at 842 (2000) (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment).
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students in the religious school's own classrooms could not be trusted to refrain from
any participation in religious programs or instruction.
128
Whatever the merits or weaknesses of these particular funding conclusions may
be, what is lacking in these cases is a clear connection between the principle denying
direct aid to religious institutions for religious purposes and the core values the
Establishment Clause represents. O'Connor appears to believe that direct and
substantial state aid for religious schools in the form of instructional materials and state
staff support does not constitute an endorsement of religion. Per capita cash grants to
religious schools, on the other hand, would constitute a prohibited endorsement.
Conversely, voucher programs resulting in the distribution of a similar amount of state
funds to religious schools would not be an endorsement. But references to the
perceptions of the "neutral observer" do not adequately explain and justify the
distinctions that O'Connor draws in these cases. Much more needs to be said here
about the impact of these various funding frameworks on religious equality than Justice
O'Connor has offered us so far in her opinions. At least more needs to be said if
O'Connor's position is going to influence otherjustices on the Court or, perhaps more
importantly, convince the polity that these decisions reflect accepted constitutional
values.
3. Beyond Endorsement-Using Free Speech and Equality Principles to
Inform the Meaning of the Establishment Clause
While the above discussion demonstrates that there are serious problems with the
application of the endorsement standard, particularly in cases involving legislative
accommodation of religious practices or the funding of religious organizations, these
difficulties do not mean that Justice O'Connor's endorsement approach is misguided
in any sense of the term. On the contrary, it is entirely to her credit that she points
Establishment Clause doctrine toward the primary values and principles at which they
should be directed-values and principles related to religious equality. The problem
with the endorsement standard is not its direction, but rather, that in relying on it,
O'Connor does not go far enough in developing equality based Establishment Clause
doctrine. The idea of endorsement is one important facet of the problem of achieving
equal respect for, and equal treatment of, the diverse religious faiths represented in
American society, but there is more to equality than the issue of endorsement. Put
simply, there is still a great deal of work to be done in this area.
Religious equality principles can be informed by race and gender equal protection
cases, but these decisions are no substitute for the very hard work of developing a
framework of equality that resonates with the distinctive nature of religious groups.
Justice O'Connor's instincts in this area are often well grounded. For example, her
intuitive reluctance to accept a regime of formal neutrality in either Free Exercise or
Establishment Clause cases reflects the reality that religious groups are not similarly
128. SeeAgostini, 521 U.S. at 226 ("[T]here is no reason to presume that, simply because she enters a parochial
school classroom, a full-time public employee such as a Title I teacher will depart from her assigned duties and
instructions and embark on religious indoctrination .... ").
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situated with regard to their beliefs and practices. O'Connor seems to realize that
treating people of different faiths as if they shared common convictions is the very
antithesis of equality. Unlike racial and gender equality where our constitutional ideal
focuses on the irrelevance of race and gender differences, a rule that prohibits taking
religious differences into account simply cannot do the job.
Just as formal neutrality does not necessarily promote religious equality, however,
a lack of formal neutrality does not necessarily undermine religious equality.
O'Connor's concern about legislative favoritism in accommodating religious practices
is clearly an important one, but insisting on formally neutral accommodations may not
be the most effective way to reconcile equality and liberty goals in these cases. Because
of the differences among faiths, many legitimate accommodations may be sect specific
in their effect. Just as the ban on the ritual slaughter of animals in Church of Lukumi
Babalu Aye v. Hialeah2 9 was correctly determined to violate the Free Exercise Clause
because it was directed exclusively against the members of the Santeria faith, an
exemption from certain municipal codes to accommodate the ritual slaughter of
animals might only be of benefit to members of the Santeria religion. But it is not clear
that such an accommodation should be held to violate the Establishment Clause
because of its limited scope.
It may be that the Court must take political process concerns into account in
evaluating religious accommodations. Although she is essentially a formalist in race
cases with regard to the appropriate standard of review applied to racial classifications,
O'Connor does recognize a difference between race-specific laws that operate as an"'engine of oppression"' and those that represent "an effort 'to foster equality in
society. 130 That difference is even more pronounced in Establishment Clause cases
involving legislative accommodations because of the inherent and legitimate
differences among religious faiths (which can be contrasted with the constitutional
ideal of the absence of racial differences) and the goal of promoting religious liberty
through accommodations, an objective that has no racial counterpart. Thus, although
there were obvious and serious sect-specific consequences of conscientious objector
laws, these accommodations of religious pacifists should not be struck down as an
expression of unconstitutional favoritism for the Quakers or the other minority faiths
they primarily benefitted. Similarly, it may be that the New York legislature's benign
objective in creating a special school district for the Sitmar Hasidim in Grumet and the
obvious minority status of the faith community benefitted by this accommodation
should have led to a different result in that case.
Developing a vision of religious equality that will help to resolve the problem of
public funding of religious organizations will also require the Court to move
significantly beyond the notion of endorsement. State funding of religious
organizations raises difficult equality questions about religious discrimination in the
hiring of staff to provide publicly financed services, discrimination in the provision of
services, and the implicit inequality that results when people of one faith are directed
129. 508 U.S. 520, 577 (1993) (Blackmun, J., with whom O'Connor, J., joins, concurring in the judgment)
(holding that municipal ban on ritual slaughter of animals constituted a religious gerrymander and violated Free Exercise
guarantees).
130. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 229 (1995).
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to public programs operated by pervasively sectarian institutions of a different religion.
Problems involving the fair allocation of resources among religious communities may
be accentuated by state expenditures that are paid directly to houses of worship or
institutions operating under the direct control of religious authorities. There are also
important concerns about the fragmentation of public life along religious lines and the
isolation of minority faiths in communities where there are too few members of a
religion to develop an institutional infrastructure capable of serving as a conduit for
public services."'3 None of these equality issues is captured by the idea of endorsement,
but they represent many of the core problems in funding cases that the Court has not
yet addressed.
Religion clause cases are sometimes erroneously described as barring religion from
the public square. The real issue for religious liberty and equality is different and more
difficult. Religion can not be denied access to public life. The critical questions involve
the terms of that access. Can religion retain the special autonomy and sphere of liberty
it rightfully demands and receives in private settings when it enters the public arena?
Do the statutory and constitutional protections provided to the exclusionary practices
a house of worship engages in to promote its religious mission also apply to its
operation as a state funded conduit for the provision of public services to a diverse
community? Or, conversely, do constitutional requirements promoting inclusion and
pluralism apply when religion moves from the private to the public domain and
undertakes to provide state subsidized services? Publicizing private life can involve
unacceptable state intrusions into the autonomy of religious institutions and impose
intolerable burdens on religious liberty. Privatizing public life can involve the state in
unacceptable religious discrimination and the subordination and isolation of minority
faiths in public life and impose intolerable burdens on religious equality. Reconciling
the constitutional interests at stake in the funding cases requires a more multifaceted
response than an endorsement standard alone can provide.'3
2
In addition to the further development of principles of religious equality, Justice
O'Connor's interpretation of the religion clauses would benefit by more explicit
recognition of the role of free speech doctrine in deciding cases involving religious
expression. A case like Texas Monthly, for example, might be more easily and
persuasively resolved by the Court's affirmation of the principle that neither Free
Exercise exemptions nor legislative accommodations of religion can justify content or
viewpoint discriminatory preferences for religious speech when conventionally
expressive activities such as the publication and sale of periodicals are the subject of
regulation. When the government regulates speech itself, free speech principles rather
than free exercise autonomy rights or establishment equality mandates should control
the Court's decision. '33 Similarly, O'Connor's analysis in Rosenberger discussing the
tension between the "no aid to religion" principle and the "neutrality" principle would
have been strengthened considerably if she had more carefully identified the role of
free speech doctrine in informing and limiting her conclusion. In the context of a wide-
131. See Brownstein, supra note 6, at 256-67; Alan E. Brownstein, Evaluating School Voucher Programs
Through a Liberty, Equality and Free Speech Matrix, 31 CONN. L. REV. 871, 909-27 (1999).
132. See Brownstein, supra note 26, at 134-45.
133. See Alan E. Brownstein, State RFRA Statutes and Freedom of Speech, 32 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 605 (1999).
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ranging designated public forum for expressive activities, free speech doctrine requires
the conclusion that the no aid standard must be subordinate to the constitutional
commitment to viewpoint neutrality. When the state supports or regulates other
activities that have little to do with expression in different contexts, however, the
rigorous neutrality imposed by free speech doctrine should not apply. 34 Speech cases
can best be resolved if they are identified forthrightly as a distinct doctrinal area, the
analysis of which will not influence free exercise or establishment decisions when
expressive activities are not the focus of regulation.
III. THE FORM OF JUSTICE O'CONNOR'S INTERPRETATION
OF THE RELIGION CLAUSES
A. Correlating Terms and Meanings
There are a variety of features of O'Connor's religion clause jurisprudence that
relate more to the form than the substance of her analysis. One such feature is her
contention that constitutional standards should clearly and actually express the values
they are designed to promote. In Board of Education of Kiryas Joel v. Grumet,'35 for
example, she criticizes attempts to describe Establishment Clause doctrine as
employing a "coercion" test, but defining prohibited "coercion" so broadly that it
applies to many activities that would not be conventionally understood as coercive in
any meaningful sense. 36 Instead, O'Connor suggests that "it is more useful to
recognize the relevant concerns in each case on their own terms, rather than trying to
squeeze them into language that does not really apply to them."' 37
Again, we might ask why the terminology utilized in decisions matters if the
holdings of cases are clear. Obviously, precision in language may improve clarity of
analysis, but the extent to which the name of a test or standard influences judicial
judgments is probably limited. Whether the Court describes a religious symbol placed
in front of city hall for the entire year as implicitly coercive or an endorsement of
religion, the ability of lower courts to analogize this ruling to other cases is unlikely to
turn on the choice between these two terms. Similarly, a state sponsored religious
invocation at a high school graduation may be described as coercive or an endorsement
of religion. The criteria the Court relies on to reach this conclusion provides important
information to lower courts confronted with arguably analogous fact patterns, but the
precise words used to describe the standard may play much less of a role in developing
a consistent line of authority.
The virtue of using terms authentically may point in an entirely different direction.
The primary beneficiary may be the polity and the political branches of government,
not the judiciary. Part of the Court'sjob is to engage in a dialogue with the coordinate
branches of government and, more importantly, with the people. The state and national
134. See Brownstein, supra note 6, at 268-78.
135. 512 U.S. 687 (1994).
136. See id. at 719 (criticizing "[a]lternatives to Lemon ... [that] lead us to find 'coercive pressure' to pray when
a school asks listeners-with no threat of legal sanctions-to stand or remain silent during a graduation prayer").
137. Id.
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governments need to understand why their activities are unconstitutional. American
society needs to understand the meaning and purpose of constitutional rules. Judicial
credibility depends on Court decisions making sense to the people and institutions
affected by the Courts' judgments. The permanence of constitutional decisions requires
eventual resonance between the community and the Court on the meaning of the
Constitution's requirements. When words are used in counterintuitive ways, holdings
seem arbitrary and, more importantly, the persuasive force of the Court's opinions is
diluted or negated.
These failings have been painfully obvious in the Court's religion clause
jurisprudence. As someone who supports a rigorously enforced Free Exercise and
Establishment Clause, I have often approved of holdings implementing the Lemon
test.138 But there is seldom anything in the opinions applying Lemon that explains in a
meaningful and intelligible way why the Court reached the conclusions that it did. The
constitutional values the Establishment Clause promotes are often lost in the pages of
these opinions. No matter how much anyone may agree with the results of particular
cases, constitutional jurisprudence of this kind fails one of its essential functions.
Justice O'Connor's endorsement test, on the other hand, communicates effectively
and repeatedly what it is that is unacceptable about state action that violates the
Establishment Clause. Citizens may fairly debate the-specifics of individual cases, but
there is a core idea here on which the Court can stand in explaining its decisions and
in terms of which its judgments can be defended. "Government cannot endorse the
religious practices and beliefs of some citizens without sending a clear message to
nonadherents that they are outsiders or less than full members of the political
community."'' 39 An important part of the merit of this standard is the accuracy with
which it expresses the constitutional value of equality in those Establishment Clause
cases where it can be meaningfully applied.
B. Standards and Balancing Tests
As has often been noted, Justice O'Connor is renowned for employing standards
and balancing tests, a clear counterpoint to the rules, subrules, and exceptions approach
of her colleague and recurrent critic, Justice Scalia. 140 O'Connor's religion clause
jurisprudence fits comfortably within this pattern. It is highly contextual, often ad hoc,
and resorts to subjective criteria and balancing tests to reach constitutional conclusions.
There are significant virtues and pitfalls to this adjudicatory style. It is important to
recognize, however, that O'Connor's reliance on contextual standards, at least in this
area of the law, reflects more than a generic preference for a particular kind of decision
making. It is a necessary consequence of her understanding of the structure of the
138. In Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602,612-13 (1971), Burger, CJ., introduced the three prongs of the now
familiar Lemon test as follows: "First, the statute must have a secular legislative purpose; second, its principal or primary
effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion ... ; finally, the statute must not foster 'an excessive
government entanglement with religion."' (citing Walz v. Tax Commission, 397 US 664, 668 (1970)).
139. County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 627(1989).
140. See generally Kathleen M. Sullivan, The Justices of Rules and Standards, 106 HARV. L. REV. 22 (1992).
2001 /A Decent Respect for Religious Liberty and Religious Equality
religion clauses as well as her substantive vision of their purpose and meaning. 14' That
is to say, I do not believe that O'Connor could alter the form of the constitutional
model she supports without fundamentally changing her structural and substantive
interpretation of the Free Exercise Clause and Establishment Clause. 142
With regard to the paradigmatic form of O'Connor's jurisprudence, her
employment of context-sensitive standards and balancing tests, I have only two points
to add to the considerable commentary that has already been written on this subject
about this Justice. First, the indeterminacy intrinsic to standards and balancing tests is
progressively reduced as lines of authority develop over time. In deciding cases
involving government expression of religious messages and the public funding of
social services provided by religious institutions, O'Connor has identified a variety of
factors that are relevant to her constitutional analysis and demonstrated their
applicability in particular circumstances. 143 These opinions do not entirely eliminate the
subjectivity and uncertainty surrounding Establishment Clause review of these issues,
but they reduce the scope of the problem and provide increasingly firmer ground for
predicting results in a larger and larger class of cases.
Second, it may be that one of the basic criticisms of constitutional standards and
balancing tests is considerably overstated. These forms of decision are challenged on
the grounds that they invite-indeed, almost require-judges to use their personal
values in reaching constitutional conclusions because of the unguided and subjective
discretion involved in their implementation. This results in the displacement of political
control from the legislative and executive branches of government, and their source of
authority, the people, to unelectedjudges who have no legitimate basis for exercising
such power.144
It is not clear, however, that the form of decisionmaking employed in a case
determines the legitimacy of the judicial authority exercised in deciding it. An
expansive and unsupported bright line rule grounded on the value proclivities of
Supreme Court Justices may limit the discretion of lower court judges more than
standards or balancing tests, but it is hard to see why it is any less a usurpation of the
polity's authority. The only distinction is that in the former case the Supreme Court
displaces political decisionmaking while in the latter lower courts are involved in doing
SO.
More importantly, the great majority of religion clause disputes in our society are
not litigated or resolved by the judiciary. They are evaluated and resolved by
bureaucrats and administrative bodies, often through informal negotiations. Judicial
decisions suggest the parameters within which these essentially political determinations
141. The connection between the form and substance ofdoctrine has often been noted particularly in free speech
commentary. See, e.g., William S. Dodge, Weighing the Listener's Interests: Justice Blackmun 's Commercial Speech
and Public Forum Opinions, 26 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 165 (1998); Shiffrin, supra note 52.
142. O'Connor makes this point explicitly in her dissent in Boerne when she urges the Court to reexamine its
holding in Smith because its formal virtues do not outweigh its substantive deficiencies: "Although it may provide a
bright line, the rule the Court declared in Smith does not faithfully serve the purpose of the Constitution." City ofBoeme
v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 565 (1997) (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
143. See supra notes 66-80, 113-27 and accompanying text.
144. See Sullivan, supra note 138, at 64-66 (describing the argument that constitutional rules are preferable to
standards because they maintain the proper relationship between the courts and the political branches of government).
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will be reached, but far more often than not, the courts do not review the actual
resolution of the dispute. Accordingly, in evaluating the role that different forms of
judicial decisions have on the exercise of political power, it may be far more useful and
relevant to consider how the Court' s opinions influence nonjudicial dispute resolution,
which accounts for the great majority of conflicts, rather than focusing on the relatively
few cases that actually proceed to trial and judgement.
From this perspective, the use of standards and balancing tests has, I believe, an
important and salutary effect on religion clause disputes. The very indeterminacy and
subjectivity of the tools the Court uses are empowering to all the parties to the conflict.
When no one can be sure how a court will evaluate an issue, there is a premium placed
on nonjudicial resolution. The door to the negotiating table is likely to be held open in
situations where it would be slammed in the face of one party or the other if the law
was clear and all entitlements or lack of entitlements were uncontestable. Results are
more likely to reflect a compromise in which the interests of both sides are taken into
account. In these situations, when the form of judicial decisionmaking creates
incentives for both government and people with grievances to discuss their problem
and reach a mutually satisfactory or at least tolerable solution, I do not think that
political power is displaced by the courts. One might argue that the nature of political
interaction is modified in that the complete subordination of one group's interests
becomes less likely in these cases. But that does not strike me as a usurpation of
political authority. Indeed, one might characterize it as accentuating republican politics
and dialogue in a very traditional sense.
IV. PLACING JUSTICE O'CONNOR'S RELIGION CLAUSE
JURISPRUDENCE IN PERSPECTIVE
First, and perhaps most importantly, Justice O'Connor's doctrinal approach
recognizes that the Constitution has a vitally important role to play in determining the
relationship between church and state, between law and religious practice. While this
may seem self-evident from a textual perspective in that religion is assigned two
separate phrases in the text of the First Amendment, much of American constitutional
history communicates a contrary message.
Freedom of religion received only anemic protection in the Court's initial
decisions. Reynolds v. United States145 held in 1878 that the Free Exercise Clause
protected religious beliefs, but not religious practices. Government was not
constitutionally constrained from adopting laws that directly prohibited conduct an
individual was obligated to perform by the requirements of his faith. It was not until
1963 in Sherbert v. Verner 146 that the Court invalidated a state burden on religiously
motivated conduct on free exercise grounds under a rigorous standard of review. The
Establishment Clause was little more than a constitutional paper tiger for most of this
period as well. While the Court acknowledged the existence of"'a wall of separation
145. 98 U.S. 145 (1878) (rejecting Free Exercise defense of polygamy on grounds that the First Amendment only
protects religious beliefs, not practices).
146. 374 U.S. 398 (1963) (holding that denial of unemployment compensation to Sabbatarian who refused to
accept employment requiring her to work on the Sabbath violated her Free Exercise Rights).
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between church and [s]tate"' in Everson v. Board of Education147 in 1947, it did not
find that the state's reimbursement to parents of the cost of sending their children to
parochial schools on public buses violated this barrier. It was not until 1962, when the
Court struck down state sponsored school prayer in Engel v. Vitale,148 that the
Establishment Clause became a serious limit on majoritarian support and promotion
of religion or specific religions.
The constitutional "Great Awakening" of the 1960s that breathed real life into both
religion clauses was of relatively short duration. Contemporary constitutional doctrine
for the last decade or more has been in a relatively steady decline from the invigorated
Free Exercise and Establishment Clause jurisprudence of the 1960s, 1 970s, and early
1980s. The role of the Constitution in limiting majoritarian preferences has been
significantly reduced. Under the Rehnquist Court, interference with religious practice
and the promotion of religious faith has become more and more a subject of political
deliberation, increasingly immunized from judicial review. 1
49
O'Connor's resistance to the current Court's almost cavalier willingness to leave
issues of religious liberty and religious equality to the mercies of majoritarian and
administrative discretion represents a commitment to thejudiciary's role in this part of
the constitutional scheme of things that distinguishes her from the other conservative
justices whose values she often shares. Otherjustices do not necessarily challenge her
description of the magnitude of the burden the state may impose on religious practices
through neutral laws of general applicability 150 or the cultural consequences for
minority faiths of state expression that publicly celebrates and acclaims the beliefs of
the majority.'5 ' Their refusal to aggressively defend individuals and minority groups
from state interference and disparagement emanates in part from their doubts about the
means and legitimacy ofjudicial intervention to provide such protection.152 O'Connor,
147. 330 U.S. 1, 16 (1947) (citing Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 164).
148. 370 U.S. 421 (1962). Two cases were decided between 1947 and 1962, McCollum v. Board of Education,
333 U.S. 203 (1948) and Zorach v. Clanson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952). McCollum struck down a program in which clergy
were permitted to offerclasses in religious education to students in public school on a voluntary basis. Zorach upheld
a "release time" program under which students were permitted to leave school to attend religious classes at separate
facilities. The combination of the two cases pointing in opposite directions did not signify a firm commitment by the
court to Establishment Clause principles.
149. See McConnell, supra note 39, at 136 (noting that the "initial response ofthe Rehnquist Court has been to
shrink the scope of both Religion Clauses and thereby to restore a significant degree of govemmental discretion"); see
generally Erwin Chemerinsky, Forward: The Vanishing Constitution, 103 HARV. L. REV. 43 (1989) (criticizing the
Rehnquist Court's commitment'to majoritarianism as a substitute for substantive constitutional decision-making).
150. See, e.g., Justice Scalia's comment in Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990), that
[i]t may fairly be said that leaving accommodation to the political process will place at a relative
disadvantage those religious practices that are not widely engaged in; but that unavoidable consequence of
democratic government must be preferred to a system in which each conscience is a law unto itself or in
which judges weigh the social importance of all laws against the centrality of all religious beliefs.
Id. at 890.
151. See County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573,673-74 (1980) (Kennedy, J., concurring with thejudgment
in part and dissenting in part) (dismissing the argument that feelings ofexclusion experienced by religious minorities
in response to state promotion of sectarian displays are relevant to Establishment Clause analysis).
152. See id., 492 U.S. at 674 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part)
Either the endorsement test must invalidate scores of traditional practices recognizing the place religion
holds in our culture, or it must be twisted and stretched to avoid inconsistency with practices we know to
have been permitted in the past, while condemning similar practices with no greater endorsement effect
simply by reason of their lack of historical antecedent. Neither result is acceptable.
See also Smith, 494 U.S. at 889 n.5 ("[lit is horrible to contemplate that federal judges will regularly balance against
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on the other hand, places the constitutional cart squarely behind, rather than before, the
fundamental rights horse. When fundamental rights and interests are at stake, she
seems to suggest, it is thejob ofjudges and courts to protect them in the best way they
can. Other concerns can not displace this primary obligation.'
It is true that Justice O'Connor's opinions do not enforce either the Free Exercise
Clause or the Establishment Clause with the rigor of earlier Warren or Burger Court
decisions. Still, there can be no doubt that O'Connor recognizes much more of a role
for the Constitution in this area than many of her contemporaries on the Court today.
Her willingness to circumvent free exercise protection in cases like Lyng and Jimmy
Swaggart and her less than forceful application of strict scrutiny in Employment
Division v. Smith demonstrate a willingness to accept substantial interference with
religious practice in a wider range of circumstances and for less compelling reasons
than more liberal members of the Court. But in cases like Bowen v. Roy and in her
repeated resistance to the Court's abdication of responsibility for free exercise rights
in Smith, O'Connor makes it clear that the state is constitutionally obliged to justify
many of the burdens it imposes on religious practice to the satisfaction of a reviewing
court. To O'Connor, the freedom to practice one's faith must remain a protected right,
not a privilege that bureaucrats, the legislature, and the majority can withdraw or ignore
at their discretion.
The same can be said for O'Connor's Establishment Clause opinions. In funding
cases, she is willing to tolerate far more governmental support for the secular functions
of religious institutions than prior cases permitted. Her conclusions in symbolic display
cases such as Lynch v. Donnelly allow government to promote religion and specific
religions to a considerable extent. 54 Still, there can be no mistaking O'Connor's
commitment to at least some core Establishment Clause values. Under the doctrinal
umbrella of her endorsement analysis, O'Connor interprets the Constitution to prohibit
government from either directly funding religious activities or explicitly promoting
religious beliefs. The value of continuing these barriers between church and state
should not be minimized or ignored because they are less formidable than the wall of
separation they replace.
In addition to insisting on a distinct role for the Constitution and the judiciary in
protecting religious freedom and equality, O'Connor assigns actual and independent
meaning to both of the religion clauses. In County ofAllegheny, she forcefully rejected
Justice Kennedy's attempt to limit the Establishment Clause to only those cases where
individuals are coerced to participate in religious rituals that are foreign to their faith
on the grounds that such an interpretation would render the two clauses redundant to
the importance of general laws the significance of religious practice.").
153. In her concurrence in Employment Division v. Smith, Justice O'Connor makes this point emphatically by
quoting Justice Jackson's famous language from Barnette with approval:
"The very purpose of a Bill of Rights was to withdraw certain subjects from the vicissitudes of political
controversy, to place them beyond the reach of majorities and officials and to establish them as legal
principles to be applied by the courts. One's right to life, liberty, and property, to free speech, a free press,
freedom of worship and assembly, and other fundamental rights may not be submitted to vote; they depend
on the outcome of no elections."
494 U.S. at 903 (quoting West Virginia State Bd. of Ed. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 638 (1943)).
154. O'Connor's analysis in Allegheny, however, can be understood as a partial retreat from her comments in
Lynch. See supra notes 71-72 and accompanying text.
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each other with the Establishment Clause adding little if anything to free exercise
principles.'55 By focusing on endorsement and status as the cornerstone of the
Establishment Clause, O'Connor grounds this constitutional mandate on equality, a
separate value denoting the importance of inclusion and respect as well as freedom
from interference.
Importantly, O'Connor recognizes that there is an inherent conflict as well as
considerable overlapping between free exercise goals and Establishment Clause
objectives under her approach. She knows that the Free Exercise Clause promotes
religious equality as well as liberty by protecting individuals of all faiths from
government interference. Indeed, her rejection of the system of formal neutrality
adopted by the Court in Employment Division v. Smith is predicated on the inherent
inequality its regime permits (in leaving the rights of religious minorities to the
proclivities of the majority's discretion) as well as the inadequate protection of
religious liberty it provides in a hyper-regulated world where the exercise of individual
rights inevitably clashes with some form of social ordering. Similarly, O'Connor
understands that Establishment Clause constraints on state promotion of religion are
intended to insure religious independence from government and the liberty such
autonomy provides in addition to requiring that government must recognize that
citizens of all faiths are of equal worth and must be treated with equal respect.
While Free Exercise and Establishment Clause values reinforce each other in
certain circumstances, some conflict between liberty and equality, or Free Exercise and
Establishment Clause guarantees, is inevitable. By definition, free exercise exemptions
facilitate and promote the exercise of religion. Depending on the context, they may
promote the religion of a specific faith alone. At some point, this exceptional treatment
of religion or a particular religion will violate Establishment Clause principles by
providing too much of a benefit to religious individuals or institutions at too great a
cost to persons who do not share their faith. O'Connor recognizes this tension in
several cases, as we have seen, and requires that her "objective observer" whose
perspective determines whether state action endorses religion must take "the Free
Exercise Clause and the values it promotes" into account in reaching this conclusion. 1
5 6
Both values must be considered. No constitutional hierarchy necessarily subordinates
one to the other in all cases.
There is a similarly inescapable tension between religious liberty and equality in
public life. Religion in many contexts is absolutist, exclusive, and hierarchical. When
these characteristics of religious belief and practice have a controlling influence on
public life, minority faiths will be marginalized or subordinated in their participation
in public programs and activities. Inclusion on equal terms for the minority requires
some sacrifice of majority prerogatives.
'Justice O'Connor's interpretation of the religion clauses recognizes that conflicting
values create hard cases. Under her approach, there will be fewer easy decisions.
Courts at all levels will have to engage in the hard work of doing justice to religious
155. SeeAllegheny, 491 U.S. at 628 ("To require a showing of coercion, even indirect coercion, as an essential
element of an Establishment Clause violation would make the Free Exercise Clause a redundancy.").
156. Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 83 (1985) (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment).
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liberty and equality in a diverse and complex social environment. They can not pass
the constitutional buck to the majority and act as if they are not surrendering important
constitutional ideals. This commitment to a careful analysis of government conduct that
interferes with or undermine religious liberty and equality is a powerful legacy to leave
to the Court, to the Constitution, and to the American people.

